Originally published by Ideas on Europe on 12 October 2023: https://jcms.ideasoneurope.eu/2023/10/12/what-is-actually-being-mainstreamed-in-the-mainstreaming-of-euroscepticism/ In recent decades criticism on the European Union (EU) and even the complete dismissal of European integration – a range of positions generally grouped under the umbrella term ‘Euroscepticism’ – have gained ground. Euroscepticism has become mainstream, as “it has become increasingly more legitimate and salient (and in many ways less contested) across Europe as a whole” (Brack & Startin, 2015, p. 240). Events such as referendums and European Parliament (EP) elections provide a particularly good opportunity for Eurosceptic movements to mobilise (Usherwood, 2017). In my recent Journal of Common Market Studies article, I look at the mainstreaming of Euroscepticism by studying the coverage of EP election debates in the Netherlands in 2009, 2014 and 2019. I examine mainstreaming through a two-part qualitative analysis that centres around a fourfold typology, which distinguishes between supportive, Euroalternative, soft Eurosceptic and hard Eurosceptic claims (Table 1). Here, I build on the concepts of soft and hard Euroscepticism developed by Taggart and Szczerbiak. Yet, by introducing ‘Euroalternativism’, I avoid soft Euroscepticism’s catch-all nature. Euroalternativism implies criticism towards (elements of) EU policies or its institutional design that is essentially supportive of the EU and European integration (FitzGibbon, 2013). I also add support for the existing nature of the EU and its policies to my categorisation, so as to take into account the “complex interaction among competing pro-integration narratives and counter-narratives to European union” (McMahon & Kaiser, 2022, p. 1). Finally, I further refine the categorisation by distinguishing between statements regarding (I) the EU polity (its political system and its institutions) and (II) EU policies. There has been relatively less attention for mass media in the study of Euroscepticism, which is surprising given their central role in contemporary European democracies (Caiani & Guerra, 2017). Furthermore, most existing research has taken a quantitative perspective, whereas scholars have argued that a qualitative approach focussing on discourses and narratives is more suitable for achieving an encompassing understanding of Euroscepticism’s changing meaning and importance (Leconte, 2015). Indeed, as Brown et al. illustrate what is and what is not mainstream in the public sphere is prone to change because ideas change through debates in that same public sphere. The first part of my analysis consists of a manual coding of EU-related claims by actors in three newspapers – De Telegraaf, De Volkskrant and NRC Handelsblad – that play a central role in the Dutch mediated public sphere. The analysis of claims focusses on two essential elements of a claim, namely, ‘who’ (the claimant) and ‘what’ (the subject of the claim), plus on determining the assessment of EU affairs through a close reading of the wording (Koopmans & Statham, 2010). The second part of the analysis zooms out again to place the claims analysis in the context of the wider EP election debates in the Dutch public sphere. Hence, in contrast to the first part of the analysis that follows a pre-established categorisation, the second part looks at the overall story and the key themes as present in the material analysed. In total I analysed 3148 claims. Figure 1 presents an overview of the way in which the EU and its policies were discussed in the Dutch-mediated debate on the EP elections. Despite some differences between the three mediated debates, it becomes clear that supportive claims are least prominent. Instead, criticism of and opposition to the EU has become widespread, whether essentially supportive or fundamentally Eurosceptic; because, while representing “pro-system opposition” (FitzGibbon, 2013), Euroalternative claims are still a form of criticism on the EU. As such, Figure 1 suggests that Euroscepticism has indeed become mainstream; that it is at the centre of the debates in the Dutch public sphere. Yet, it comes in different guises, namely, Euroalternative, soft Eurosceptic and hard Eurosceptic claims. Building on this, the second part of the analysis calls for an even more nuanced assessment and puts forward three key points.
First, during the three EP elections, Euroscepticism in its various guises was specifically mainstreamed in a debate that concerned the pros and cons of integration, with limited attention for policies. This illustrates that there is an interplay between pro-con narratives, as suggested by McMahon and Kaiser (2022). Second, what is being mainstreamed still amounts to a vague notion of Euroscepticism. As such, we may ask what Euroscepticism was being mainstreamed? For instance, in an article in De Volkskrant on 5 June 2009, the ongoing campaign was said to be “governed by Euroscepticism”, while it simultaneously referred to a “Eurocritical wave” and the “anti-European camp”. Third, at the same time, the place of Eurosceptics in the debate gradually changes, turning them from outsiders into insiders. Eurosceptics’ existence is no longer merely observed and noted, but they are increasingly treated as equal and legitimate actors in the EU debate. Brexit may have mattered here, as the hard edges of Euroscepticism have at least partly withered away (cf. de Vries, 2018). In essence then, my article illustrates that the statement that Euroscepticism has become mainstream is partly a simplification of a development in which criticism of and opposition to the EU are prone to change. Even focussing on EP elections alone creates problems, as they skew debates toward issues of integration – in some of my other work, I find that day-to-day EU debates focus on policies and policy alternatives. It is therefore important that we continue to treat the term ‘Euroscepticism’ with caution. In fact, perhaps we need to even go one step further and, paraphrasing Ophir (2018), ought to ask ourselves ‘what kind of concept is Euroscepticism?’. In other words, shouldn’t researchers in the field of Euroscepticism consider re-launching the conceptual debate? Obviously, this is not an easy challenge. Yet, it exactly this conceptual puzzle that I am currently exploring with my colleague Luca Mancin and we are looking forward to sharing our thoughts at a conference near you soon!
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Originally published by the DCU Brexit Blog on 19 January 2022. After a record 271 days of negotiations a new Dutch coalition government took office on Monday 10 January. Although, is it really new? The same four parties that formed the previous government – Christian-Democratic CDA, Christian CU, Social-Liberal D66 and Conservative-Liberal VVD – are also in the new government. Yet, it does come with many new faces and plans. This includes what is at first sight a rather different approach towards the EU.
In the recent past the Netherlands has become known as a reluctant EU member, particularly following ‘Black Monday’ in 1991, when an ambitious Dutch blueprint for a federal Europe was rejected, and the Dutch ‘No’ to the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, partly due to increased dissatisfaction with the pace and extent of European integration. Whether the Dutch ever were passionate believers in European integration before that time, may be questioned. But the country having become known as a member of the ‘New Hanseatic League’ and one of the ‘Frugal Four’ (for an insightful study, see here), it seemed almost like it had become a UK lite, stepping into the gap that occurred after Brexit to become perhaps the most Eurosceptic member of the EU. It therefore may come as a surprise that the new coalition agreement reads that “The Netherlands will play a leading role in making the EU more effective, economically stronger, greener and more secure.” But there’s more.
Of course, the proof is in the pudding; these are words on paper and reality may be quite different. But, as Rem Korteweg of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael also noted in a recent Twitter thread, some of the wording of the Dutch coalition agreement is quite similar to that of the new German government. Unlike the German government, the Dutch are not calling for a federal EU. But with the French and the Germans now seeing eye-to-eye on a number of EU reforms, the similarity between the two coalition agreements suggests that the new Dutch government may have become a Germany lite that will no longer put a break on the further development of the EU. Co-authored with Afke Groen. This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 15 March 2017 (in English) and the websites of the EU-Asia Institute of the ESSCA School of Management and Alliance Europa on 11 March (both in French). Last year many commentators were blown away by the British vote to leave the European Union (EU) and the election of President Donald Trump in the United States. The Irish commentator and economist David McWilliams called 2016 “the year of the outsider”. Predictions are that 2017 will not be different, with important elections taking place all over Europe. Many see the Dutch elections as “the first big test” of what’s to come. The country’s leading populist politician, Geert Wilders, has already proclaimed a “patriotic spring” that may increase the pressures on an already besieged EU. We previously wrote about how Dutch politics works, and about the rise and chances of Geert Wilders in the 2017 national elections. In this blog post, we question the idea that the Dutch elections mark the start of a “patriotic spring” – that is, the idea that “the people” will regain control from “the elite” at the national and European level.
So far “Europe” hardly plays a role in the Dutch election campaign. Even Wilders seems to steer away from the issue. As Stijn van Kessel of Loughborough University elaborates, data shows that the Dutch do not want a ‘Nexit’. Moreover, other issues are prevailing in the campaign. The most dominant overarching theme is the Dutch economy, and in particular the question of what policy to pursue in times of a budget surplus and low unemployment. The economy is typically a theme that Dutch politicians like to link to the EU (“lots of red-tape”, “we are net-payers”, and “no more money to Greece”). But in this campaign, politicians have rather linked it to the question of what is important to Dutch society: should extra money mostly go to creating more jobs, reforming the health care system, investing in climate change policies, improving the educational system, and so on. Another overarching theme is that of what constitutes Dutch identity in the wake of globalization. A “patriotic spring” presupposes debates about national identity threatened by cosmopolitan elites and outside pressures. Yet, in the current election campaign the discussion seems to be rather more nuanced, centering on how to redefine national identity without necessarily rejecting immigration and European integration. For example, leader of the Christian Democrats Sybrand Buma emphasizes national symbols; he brought up the idea of having pupils sing the national anthem at schools. Jesse Klaver, leader of the Greens, rather emphasises an inclusive culture of tolerance and diversity. Moreover, it is quite likely that Wilders will be sidelined after 15 March. First, most parties have stated that they do not want to cooperate with him. Second, one week before the elections the latest polls also suggest that he will not gain the high number of votes that was predicted just a few weeks ago. This does not mean that Wilders’ ideas are being ignored. As has often happened in Dutch political history, mainstream parties had already adopted some of his populist and even nationalist discourse on issues such as immigration and European integration. For instance, while at face value his ideas seem to be less prominent, the fact that identity is a key issue during the current campaign can be attributed to him. Interestingly, in the wake of the alleged “patriotic spring”, a counter movement even seems to be emerging. The “rise of the populist right” is often seen as a linear process, starting with Brexit and Trump, and continuing throughout elections on the European continent. But pitted against the populist right-wing ideas of Wilders are a set of beliefs that stress diversity and openness towards outside influences. This is most visibly illustrated by the increasing support for parties such as the social-liberal D66 and the Greens. There seems to be a similar trend in France and Germany, where, respectively, pro-European Emmanuel Macron and former European Parliament President Martin Schulz are making unexpected gains in the polls. They too emphasise ideas of openness and tolerance and the need to cooperate at the European level. All in all, it could just as well be that the Dutch elections will not lead to the start of a “patriotic spring” of the European populist far right, but signal a rebalancing of European politics. This post was originally published by Alliance Europa/Ideas on Europe on 6 March 2017 and is also available in French here and here). The year 2017 is widely seen as hugely important for European politics, with general elections in key European Union member states Germany and the Netherlands – and perhaps even in Italy – and presidential elections in France. Following the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote and the election of President Donald Trump in the United States, populist parties have a real chance of dominating the campaigns in all the aforementioned countries.
The country to kick of this string of elections is the Netherlands. General elections will take place on 15 March of this year and by the looks of it they may result in further fragmentation of the Dutch political landscape. Citizens can choose between no less than 28 parties, from established parties such as the Christian Democratic CDA, the Social Democratic PvdA, and the Liberal VVD, to relative newcomers such as the Party for the Animals, Jesus Lives and, of course, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom. The Netherlands is one of the key examples of what political scientist Arend Lijphart has called a “consensus democracy”. Consensus democracies are characterised by multi-party systems and proportionate representation, with power being shared between different societal groups. The Dutch political process is shaped by broad agreements, consensus and coalitions, which should accommodate the wishes of political minorities. The period of pillarisation, lasting from approximately 1917 until halfway through the 1960s, represented the apex of Dutch consensus politics. During this period society was divided in four pillars (Catholics, Protestants, Socialists and Liberals) which had an impact on almost every aspect of life. Yet, even during the 1960s and 1970s, a period of de-pillarisation and increased polarisation, and later phases of more manifest political competition, a consensual approach has been at the centre of Dutch politics. To this day, cabinet-formation as well as day-to-day politics requires coalitions. Collegial cabinets are responsible to and dependent on parliament. As a result, Dutch politicians have also been reluctant to consider the option of minority governments. One of the most prominent exceptions to this rule has been the CDA-VVD government, headed by Prime Minister Mark Rutte, which was dependent on support by Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom. The outgoing government is a coalition of PvdA and VVD, once again with Mark Rutte. This government has had a majority in the main chamber of parliament, the House of Representatives, but required support from other parties to reach a majority in the Senate which needs to approve legislation agreed upon in the House. Voter turnout has always been quite high in the Netherlands: above 70% since the abolition of compulsory voting in 1970. Yet, as has been the case on other countries, electoral volatility has increased as ideology, class and religion have become less important and party membership decreased. The dominance of the traditional parties has declined since the 1960s and smaller parties, such as D66 (Social Liberals) and GroenLinks (Greens), have come to play a lasting role in Dutch politics. On top of this, new parties have entered the political scene since the early-2000s, typically characterised by more radical views and populist tactics that appeal to dissatisfied voters. Some newcomers, such as Pim Fortuyn’s populist-conservative LPF party, only managed to last a short time. Yet, Geert Wilders has enjoyed more or less continuous success since the mid-2000s. An extremely low electoral threshold of approximately 0.7% and a system of proportional representation in a single, nation-wide constituency explain why so many parties can achieve parliamentary representation. In addition, party splits and mergers have been numerous due to internal differences – since the 2012 elections, eight Members of Parliament left their party to form six new parliamentary groups, quite a few of which are now standing for election. The high number of parties with parliamentary representation is one of the main disadvantages of proportional representation, as it complicates political decision-making. Coalition governments are based on often very detailed coalition agreements. These agreements are often the result of lengthy negotiations, the longest having taken 208 days – nowhere near the Belgian record of 541 days, but still. The last one took 54 days. This seems to make it more difficult for opposition parties to influence policymaking. Yet, they do actually have a say, for example in the drafting of legislation in parliamentary committees. Consequently, opposition parties regularly support government legislation. And even while the influence of some new parties has been modest, they may have a more lasting impact on the programmes of established political parties and on political discourse in general. This is due to the fact that throughout Dutch political history established parties often adopted the ideas of new parties. This then is the main draw of a system of proportional representation: it accommodates the views of a variety of groupings in a country that has always been one of relative minorities. The latest polls suggest that 14 out of 28 parties may actually make it into parliament on 15 March. Polls also suggest a close race between PVV and VVD for the title of biggest party, with each now polling at approximately 17%. CDA, D66 and the Greens are all at 10-11%, followed by PvdA at approximately 8%. As nearly all parties have ruled out a coalition with Geert Wilders, it seems quite likely that the next government will be based on a coalition between 4 or more parties. So, expect to see a lengthy negotiation process in which parties with rather different programmes will have to come to an agreement. In the past Dutch politicians have proven to be able to tackle this challenge. And unless some parties withdraw on their pledges not to work with Geert Wilders, they have to. |
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