This blog was originally published by the DCU Brexit Institute on 24 June 2021. If there is one thing that has become clear during the long years of Brexit negotiations between the EU and the UK, it is that the EU27 – despite their differences – were able to act in a united way when it came to negotiating with a soon-to-be third country. Highlighting the perks of membership has played a role in this. In her 2019 JCMS Annual Review lecture, Brigid Laffan also argued that one of the EU’s strategic goals in this process was “to affirm the Union’s dominance in governing transnational relations in Europe.”
Yet, the two sides continue to haggle about their divorce. While the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement came into force on 1 May 2021, the ongoing discussions about the status of Northern Ireland show that Brexit by no means is a done deal. The divorce came with an agreement to maintain an open border between Ireland and Northern Ireland to uphold the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Yet, the UK already wants to alter this Protocol as it comes with checks on British goods entering Northern Ireland, effectively creating a border within the UK. In the context of the recent G7 summit, UK Brexit negotiator David Frost even attended a meeting wearing Union Jack socks in a not-so-subtle message for the EU. Whereas the Europeans continue to take a tough negotiating stance affirming their trust in rule-based international relations, the British approach to Northern Ireland might tempt others into trying to get out of existing agreements. If it is so (relatively) easy to undermine an agreement with the EU, wouldn’t other non-EU European countries be willing to do so too? Two recent developments are worth discussing in this context. First, in late May Switzerland pulled out of negotiations on a detailed partnership agreement with the EU. EU-Swiss relationships have never been straightforward, as illustrated by a range of referendums that had a (potential) impact on dealings between the two. For instance, only in September last year the Swiss rejected a proposal on ending the free movement agreement with the EU in a referendum that “echoed the Brexit vote”, according to The Guardian. The partnership agreements, negotiations on which have been going in since 2014, were partly an attempt to reduce uncertainty by means of an encompassing agreement that would replace the many existing bilateral agreements. Like in the case of Brexit, here too the debate revolves around the Swiss wanting exemptions from rules that the EU wants to uphold. Foreign Policy columnist Caroline de Gruyter has even called Switzerland the “next big problem” for the EU. A second example relates to reports that Norwegian opposition parties may want to renegotiate the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement should they get into government. Like Switzerland, Norway may not be an EU member, but it is closely tight to the EU through an intricate web of rules. While the Norwegians voted against EU membership on two occasions in 1972 and 1994, the current situation has been less controversial. While agriculture and fisheries remain divisive issues, relations with the EU overall remain quite well. Indeed, reflecting on potential similarities with Brexit, John Erik Fossum and Joachim Vigrestad argue that it is unlikely that Norwegian politicians would want to jeopardise relations with the EU. In their view, “the sheer size and magnitude of the EU–Norway power asymmetry” is acknowledged and shapes the Norwegian debate. Relations between the EU and Norway might be said to differ from those with Switzerland by being more firmly established through the EEA. Yet, recent debates in both countries show that relations with the EU are not uncontested. Brexit may even have put a new spotlight on these debates. Yet, the question is how committed critics are to really change relations with the EU, especially given the economic benefits they have been enjoying so far. In any case, it is likely that they will encounter an EU that is committed to a united and robust negotiating stance. There is a continued need to reaffirm the value of full membership vis-à-vis ties with the EU as a third country. And while the continuing Brexit saga may heighten hopes in some countries that a new relationship with the EU is possible, it is also likely to reaffirm the EU’s commitment to rule-based relations.
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This blog was originally published by the DCU Brexit Blog on 12 December 2019. Finally. Jean-Claude Juncker has bid us ‘au revoir’ via his own edition of the Politico Playbook and the new Von der Leyen Commission started earlier this month. Things didn’t go as smoothly as some had hoped, with the European Parliament blocking three of the candidate Commissioners (László Trócsányi, Hungary; Rovana Plumb, Romania; Sylvie Goulard, France). But VDL and her team have set to work – as have new European Council president Charles Michel and new European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde.
A few months back I reflected on the incoming European Commission in another DCU Brexit post. The game of musical chairs has gone at the expense of the much-hoped gender balance in the VDL Commission – although, as this picture tweeted by Charles Michel shows, EU leadership has generally become quite a bit more balanced! Another difference is that the Commission is no longer ‘Protecting our European Way of Life’ but rather ‘Promoting’ it. Although we still don’t know what ‘Our European Way of Life’ is exactly, the Commission’s website does raise questions about how ‘fundamental rights’ and ‘strong borders’ will be combined. But let’s give VDL and her team a chance and, instead, look at what will be coming her way in the near future. Here are three feature films coming to European cinemas soon! 1. Spitzenkandidaten, Part Deux One issue that I wrote about in more detail in my previous DCU post, concerned the EU’s democratic nature and the need for treaty changes. So, what can we expect from the Commission here? Not too much, probably, as the member states will be in the lead. But the recent Franco-German non-paper on the EU’s future suggests that discussions will certainly affect future Commissions. The document refers to the need “to promote democracy and European values and to ensure a more efficient functioning of the Union and its Institutions.” Vintage back to the future rhetoric. But interestingly, the paper also directly refers to “transnational lists and lead candidate system”. This suggests that the Parliament’s much-loved Spitzenkandidaten system seems to have now been accepted by Macron and Merkel as the way forward. And that new voting arrangements for European elections may even be on the agenda. Can’t wait until the 2024 European elections! 2. Climate Wars: The Return of the Jedi This week the new (and returning) executive vice-President of the Commission, Frans Timmermans, will present the contours of the Union’s new Green Deal to the European Parliament. Given that Parliament has declared a state of climate emergency, questions will certainly be asked. Some of the ideas that have made it to European media, have already been heavily criticised by environmental groups. Meanwhile, European businesses and EU leaders – the latter being confronted with protests against environmental legislation at home – may want plans to be less ambitious. Finding a compromise between these different interests will be a mammoth task and an important one at that. But, given that Frans Timmermans has taken on the beard of a wise Jedi Knight, the force may be strong with this one. Script and soundtrack have already been leaked! 3. Monty Python and the Holy Brexit The British elections are just around the corner. And perhaps Brexit is too. The Conservatives are in the lead in the opinion polls, though this does not necessarily mean that they will win a majority of seats. Labour would hold a new referendum on Brexit, should they win the elections, whereas the LibDems would revoke Article 50 to stop Brexit altogether. Neither of them really stands a chance of gaining a majority, though, but being part of a coalition would also put Brexit into question. If Boris’ Conservatives win a majority, the British leaving the EU will be a matter of weeks. But even if Boris takes the win and Britain leaves the EU, this will only be the start of determining what their future relationship will look like. And will the EU27 remain as unified when having to negotiate a trade deal with the UK? And if Boris doesn’t win, we may be back to where we were a few months back. And the months before that. And last year… So, if you’re in the Commission, always look on the bright side of life: you’ll still be talking about EU-UK for quite a while! Brexit, climate change, the future of the EU? It’s back to the future with the new Commission, with three challenges that are likely to stay. Turns out that Jean-Claude Juncker truly understands European politics best: rather than saying ‘goodbye’, we should say ‘au revoir’. This post was originally published by the DCU Brexit Institute Blog on 21 May 2019. At the time of writing, we are nearing the third anniversary of the Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016. While a cause for celebration or a grave feeling of loss, depending on where you stand on the issue, it almost feels like nothing much has happened since. In fact, while Brexit originally was to happen on 29 March of this year, British politicians have been unable to reach agreement on what that Brexit should look like. As a result, Brexit has been postponed, most recently until the end of October 2019.
After many ‘meaningful’ votes (oh, the irony…) we are now in a situation in which British citizens are asked to vote during the upcoming European Parliament (EP) elections of 23-26 May 2019, something that both the British government and the European Union (EU) wanted to avoid. What might this development hold for the EP elections? The composition of the EP The most visible and at the same time most confusing result of the EP elections taking place pre-Brexit concerns the future composition of the parliament. The inaugural plenary session of the newly elected parliament is scheduled for 2 July 2019, nearly four months before the new Brexit date. But already in June group composition will be discussed. Parliament’s main business will first concern the composition of the new European Commission. As Simon Usherwood explained elsewhere on the DCU Brexit Blog, 73 of the newly elected 751 Members of European Parliament (MEPs) will be representing the British people. This has a direct effect on the composition of some groups. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group was about to lose a large share of its membership – the MEPs from the Conservative Party – but will certainly have newly elected MEPs in their midst that will leave again when Brexit becomes reality. The same applies to the Party of European Socialists, of which Labour is currently a member of. The PES might benefit from this vis-à-vis the European People’s Party in the context of the Spitzenkandidaten contest, even though polls suggest that the EPP will remain the biggest party. When (if?) Brexit becomes reality, the newly elected British MEPs will leave again. The number of MEPs will then decrease to 705. Of the 73 British seats, 46 will be reserved for future enlargements and 27 will be redistributed to other countries. Does this mean that MEPs for these seats will already be elected, but can only take up their seat after Brexit? This is an issue that may be more complicated than anticipated. Euroscepticism and parliamentary politics post-Brexit Whether Eurosceptic parties in other countries are to benefit from this situation is difficult to predict. On the one hand, they could use the current situation as an example of how the EU prohibits nation-states from going their own way – against the outcome of a popular vote. Yet, on the other hand, we have seen that support for EU membership has gone up since Brexit and the current situation may simply highlight the chaos that awaits one when wanting to leave the EU. In any case, these are going to be interesting elections. As I already wrote elsewhere, we are seeing a political landscape evolve that better represents the topic that many citizens associate European elections with: are you for or against the EU? Whether we like it or not, with Macron pushing for a pro-European alliance and Salvini (soon to be joined by Orbán?) representing the Eurosceptic vote, we might see a campaign that also highlights this issue instead of the different policy choices to be made. And while the pro-European parties will remain the dominant force, Eurosceptic parties are projected to win more seats than ever before. While their representation in the EP may be a good thing for EU democracy, whether or not an increased number of Eurosceptic MEPs will change EU politics and the functioning of EP is another story. As Nathalie Brack shows in her recent book, informal and formal rules limit the political opportunities for Eurosceptic MEPs. In addition, the way in which these MEPs engage with EP business ranges from near-complete absence to full engagement. This is partly to be explained by the diversity between Eurosceptic parties, with some being against any form of European integration, whereas other rather campaign for a different Europe. What’s next? If only we knew. The Brexit saga has been one of many expected and unexpected plot twists. During the campaign for the 2024 European elections, we may look back at this whole affair as an interesting experiment, after Brexit was rejected in another referendum in 2020. Or we may see an election campaign that is concerned with the politics of an EU that has moved on after Britain finally left on 31 October 2019. Or perhaps just a few months later. This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 20 March 2019. I have a confession to make: in the more than two years that we are now running this blog, Russell and I have actually never met in person! Russell has links with the Netherlands; and, even worse, I was in London twice during the last 5 months alone. But the closest that we came to meeting was during a recent episode of TRT World’s ‘Roundtable’ on Brexit, in which we both appeared – but in my case only via Skype. While Russell and I clearly need to work on our relationship, both of us appearing in the same programme also made me think about the role of experts in contemporary society.
According to the Oxford online dictionary an expert is “A person who is very knowledgeable about or skilful in a particular area.” Experts have gained an important role in society. They, for instance, are a key source of information for EU institutions and other administrative and political bodies. And although Michael Gove (in)famously claimed that people “have had enough of experts”, those same experts are continuously asked to comment on contemporary developments – both Russell and I have regularly been asked to comment on Brexit in media at local, regional, national and international level. Discussing the same topic during the same television programme creates an acute sense of awareness of your role as an expert. People expect us to say and write knowledgeable stuff, but maybe when it comes to Brexit we are also slowly running out of ammunition. Brexit is, of course, an unprecedented development. States and territories have left the EU and its predecessors before, or have left member-states and thus became non-members by default (Algeria became independent from France in 1962; Greenland, in 1985, and Saint Barthélemy, in 2012, withdrew to become so-called overseas countries and territories of the EU). And, let’s not forget, other countries decided to refrain from membership or withdrew their applications, such as Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Yet, his is the first time ever that a prominent member state is leaving the EU. Perhaps Brexit is not that much of a surprise given that Britain has always been an ‘awkward partner’, but it is difficult to predict what Brexit really means. Brexit means Brexit, right? But what will Brexit actually look like and what will be its consequences? Even we ‘experts’ don’t know anymore. Consider the many options that are now on the table, some which many people had not expected at all. There’s the EU-UK deal with the (in)famous ‘backstop’, which currently doesn’t receive enough support from either parliament nor the people on the street. Theresa May’s Plan B seems to be Plan A turned on its back, with the EU not willing to budge. And then there’s the no-deal Brexit scenario, which all but a few hard Brexiteers – those are among the Brexiteers with a “special place in hell” – seem to want to avoid. Even a no-Brexit scenario, although not very likely, is not completely of the table, certainly since calls for a second referendum or a general election are still out there. And then there’s the post-Brexit world. Even in a scenario where the EU and the UK agree to a deal after all, this is only the first step in setting up their future relationship. What will that relationship look like? And will the EU27 remain as unified as they currently are when having to negotiate a trade deal with the UK? We are charting new territory here. Experts answering these questions should perhaps say that we do not always know either. Mind you, I am not bored of Brexit and can surely speculate about it based on what I do know. But we should also not be afraid to admit that we don’t know everything. This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 9 November 2018. Although the 2019 European elections are still over half a year away, we have seen a flurry of activity across Europe and regular media coverage of these activities. This ranges from the potential new alignment of parties in European Parliament, to the floating of names for top EU positions.
Brexit plays a role in this in two ways. First, 73 British members will soon be leaving the European Parliament. There already has been a decision on what to do with these vacant seats. More interesting is what this will mean for different party groups. The European Conservatives and Reformists, in particular, will lose a large chunk of its membership. But other groups will see quite a few members leaving too. Second, Brexit has given Eurosceptics across Europe the feeling that the tide is on their side – even though their results in recent national elections have been mixed (to say the least). This feeling of euphoria is not limited to the likes of Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. Viktor Orbán has gradually become even more vocal in terms of his criticism on ‘Brussels’, as is the case for parties such as the 5 Start Movement in Italy. What could this mean in light of the 2019 European elections? The European elections have long been characterised by a strange paradox: while its powers have gradually increased with the aim of strengthening its democratic standing, voter turnout has been going down since the first direct elections in 1979. In 2014 the European Parliament coined the phrase “this time it’s different”, implying that there really was something at stake in the elections (think Spitzenkandidaten, Euro crisis, etc.), but to no avail. Yet, the 2019 elections may really become quite different. Not because of the Spitzenkandidaten (who knows Martin Weber or even Alexander Stubb, really?), but rather because of the realignment of political groups. There has been movement on several fronts. Italy’s 5 Star Movement is expected to launch a new pro-European, anti-establishment group after Christmas. Also, European movement Volt is aiming to disrupt traditional politics with a very pro-European message. Despite such developments, at the moment we see two main camps emerging: a progressive, pro-European movement and conservative, Eurosceptic movement. This actually may increase the chances of these elections actually tying in with what’s really on voters’ minds. Namely, are you for or against the EU and further integration? While this, arguably, is not what these elections should be about (why not discuss different policy options, as the main groups have always argued for?), this is how they have been framed in mediated public debates. On the one hand, although still within the christian democratic group himself,Victor Orbán’s flirt with ‘illiberal democracy’ may be attractive to other parties, in particular those who are part of the European Conservatives and Reformists group and are in danger of losing their ‘home’ (and, hence, funding, speaking time, and other resources). The Polish Law and Justice Party could be tempted into joining forces with Orbán, but perhaps even some of the other Eurosceptic parties in parliament may be willing to join. Together they may form a force for less integration and more sovereignty for the member states. One the other hand, French president Emmanuel Macron is making steps towards setting up a progressive, pro-European movement. This may be an attractive option for the Liberals – see Verhofstadt’s wheeling and dealing – but also for Green parties across Europe – with Daniel Cohn-Bendit already a prominent campaigner in Macron’s camp. It is within these two groups that, today, we find some of the more pro-European politicians, not in the social democratic and christian democratic groups. In fact, during several recent national elections the Greens have emerged as a progressive alternative to populist parties. In other words, the 2019 European elections may finally get to see the polarised debate between pro-European and Eurosceptic politicians that is normally mostly only framed as such in the mediated public debate. And while this may not be the politicisation that some would like to see, it may be exactly this debate that is needed in times of Brexit, Italian budget rows, and Trump’s seeming willingness to break down the international order. The time for muddling through seems to have come to an end and a democratic vote is the right way to decide what to do next. Are we going to combat these challenges together? Or do we want national governments to do the work on their own, in ‘splendid isolation’? This post was originally published by E-International Relations and Law Blogs Maastricht on 20 April 2018. Co-authored with Mark T. Kawakami of the university's Law Faculty. While the EU proudly proclaims its motto to be “United in Diversity”, it is difficult to ignore the reality that various attempts at European harmonization have also engendered animosities and frustration between the EU Member States. Brexit is the most obvious manifestation of this tension. The divorce negotiations between Britain and the EU, which just have entered into their second year, are almost a self-fulfilling prophecy predicted back in the 1970s. While pointing to Brexit may seem too easy of an example to substantiate the statement above, there are some fundamental differences between the Brits and the Continental Europeans that not only have made their relationship increasingly difficult, but may make their divorce even more acrimonious.
From the start of the European integration process, Britain has been, in the words of Stephen George, an “awkward partner”, with warm feelings for European integration only present among pockets of society. Whether Britain is the only “awkward partner”, may be open to debate, but from the moment the European Communities were formed in the 1950s, the British position towards European integration has mostly been lukewarm. Joining the European Communities did not even appear to be an option at first; as their focus was primarily on the Commonwealth and the country’s “special relationship” with the United States. Yet, as the British Empire dwindled and European integration got off to a successful start, the Brits changed their tune and applied for membership in 1961. Due to the French opposition, however, it was not until 1973 that Britain officially joined the Communities. It did not take long before problems arose, as the UK Labour party quickly pledged to renegotiate the membership deal; something that was accepted by the other Member States (sounds familiar, doesn’t it?). On 5 June 1975, the British people overwhelmingly voted in favor of continued membership (with a turnout rate of 64.62%, of which 67.23% voted in favor of continued membership). So, the Anglo-European marriage did not start off well and it certainly wasn’t a marriage based on true love. From the get go, there has been a rather widely shared feeling that the British islands were somehow different from “the continent”. In his book, A Cultural History of British Euroscepticism, Menno Spiering refers to a cultural divide that lies at the heart of the British position towards the EU and argues “that over the years Homo Britannicus has branched off from Homo Europaeus.”The controversial issue of the British relations with “the continent” has cut through society and politics, with both major parties housing fierce opponents and convinced proponents of European integration. Myths and stereotypes came to play an important role in British debates about Europe. From the decision to classify Kilts as women’s wear to the infamous curved bananas, the representation of the European Commission in Britain even offers a “Euromyth A-Z index”! In light of these realities, it should not come as a surprise that the now widely used (and abused) term Euroscepticism originates in Britain. It was first used by the British press during the 1980s to describe Margaret Thatcher’s strained position towards European integration. In fact, according to Nick Startin, the sceptic stance of large parts of the British media towards the EU has played a key role in a process that eventually resulted in the Brexit vote on 23 June 2016. Specifically in the field of law, this difference between the Brits and Continental Europeans visibly manifests itself in the debate over the principle of good faith. In civil law jurisdictions (from the Continental lawyer’s perspective), the principle of good faith requires that the parties to a contract treat one another fairly and reasonably, even in adversarial situations. The doctrine of good faith applies even in pre- and post-contractual situations, when the parties are negotiating over the terms of contract or discussing damages after the contract has been breached. For example, in a sales contract, the principle of good faith attaches various information duties on the seller, who must provide all relevant information to the buyer that could potentially affect the buyer’s decision to purchase the good or not. In the UK (from a common lawyer’s perspective), however, the principle of good faith – for the most part – is something strange and alien, if not something frowned upon. In the words of Lord Ackner in Walford v. Miles (1992), “the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties involved in negotiations.” Rather, most common lawyers adhere to the principle of caveat emptor, or buyer beware, which is to suggest that it is the responsibility of the parties to investigate and figure out for themselves what they are getting themselves into. The other party to the contract is NOT expected to conduct themselves in a reasonable or fair manner. Even the esteemed English commercial lawyer, Roy Goode, spoke very critically against the principle of good faith, stating that “[t]he predictability of the legal outcome of a case is more important than absolute justice” and requiring courts and businesses to consider “vague concepts of fairness” within the context of commercial transactions is something that is undesirable because it would “make judicial decisions unpredictable…” These two legal cultures were happily minding their own business, until the formation of the European Union. In attempting to harmonize the laws of its members, the EU implemented various Directives and Regulations with the aim of merging and marrying two distinct systems of law. The European legislatures’ decision to preserve the principle of good faith in many of the European legal instruments (thus forcing it down the throats of many Brits) was always a source of awkward tension. Now that the UK is ejecting itself from the confines of the EU what interest would they have to keep the principle of good faith within their legislations? And perhaps more interestingly, what incentive – if any – does the British politicians and negotiators have to negotiate their exit in a fair and reasonable manner? This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 15 January 2017. Co-authored with Russell Foster (King's College London). 2016 was an eventful year for Europeans. A Dutch rejection of European Union extension, the Union’s uneasy refugee deal with Turkey, the shock of Brexit, the selection of an American president-elect whose (lack of) economic vision casts shadows over transatlantic commerce, and finally a referendum in Italy which, like its earlier counterpart in the Netherlands, seems to suggest growing popular resistance to the European project. 2016 is already being recorded as the year in which deep dissatisfactions and structural weaknesses in the EU, some traceable to the Credit Crunch of 2008 and some to the foundations of the post-war project in the 1950s, finally reached critical mass. Expansion has halted. The Eurozone is fracturing faster than the cracks can be repaired. And the second-most powerful economy in the Union has opted to withdraw into internal factionalism, inspiring movements across the continent as angry and disillusioned voters tired of the distant plutocrats of the status quo throw in their lot with anti-establishment, unashamedly anti-European parties that defy categorisation according to an obsolete left/right spectrum. Yet these events were merely an opening skirmish. The Battle for Europe has barely begun.
Welcome to 2017. A year which, as a spate of media attention suggests, will be recorded as an epochal year in European history. A year that might be used by future historians to mark the end of the long twentieth century; a year over which people might retrospectively lament the end of the post-war project. Perhaps 2017 will not be quite so bleak, and future scholars may see this year as the beginning of the European Union’s renaissance rather than its apocalypse. But one thing is for certain – 2017 is the year in which the fate of the European Union will be decided. Elections are scheduled in countries whose commitment to, and involvement in, Europe are far more significant than the withdrawal of an archipelago nation whose support for the Union has always oscillated between lukewarm and grudging. In the EU’s core states of France, Germany and the Netherlands, Marine Le Pen’s Front National, Frauke Petry’s Alternative für Deutschland, and Geert Wilder’s Partij voor de Vrijheid might propel into power charismatic isolationists who will make Nigel Farage and Norbert Hoffer appear amateurish. Three elections that have the potential to change Europe as we know it. Both Le Pen and Wilders have already confirmed that, if they win, they will organise referendums on Frexit and Nexit (admit it; ‘Brexit’ at least sounds better). Petry has not dismissed European integration as such, but does want a referendum on the Eurozone. While this might appear harmless in comparison, it raises the serious question of whether the European Union can continue to exist without the Eurozone, or whether the two are now so entwined that the dismemberment of the common currency area will drag the entire European project with it. Predictions at present are unclear, but 2016 was a year of wrong predictions. “Brexit? After the fury of the Scottish schism, surely the English will come to their senses.” “Trump? That incompetent charlatan? Of course not!” Yet here we are. If there is one thing to learn from last year, it is that we are out-of-step with our own populations. It must be conceded that none of this may happen. In early December 2016, pundits expected that Austria would end up under an admittedly ceremonial, but powerfully symbolic right-wing populist, the first since the defeat of the New Order in 1945. Instead, the new president is to be a liberal politician and former member of the Greens. Perhaps there is hope, and perhaps further hope for popular support for the EU will come from an unlikely source – Brexit. In the summer of 2016 Europeans feared a surge in anti-Europe sentiment across the continent. This has admittedly happened. But as the shock of Brexit – whether horror or elation – dulls into banality and tedium, it is increasingly clear that Brexit is going to be an ugly, messy, mutually spiteful process. And in a dark irony, this might be the salvation of Europe. None of this may happen. In late November last year the European Parliament’s chief negotiator, liberal MEP Guy Verhofstadt, reportedly welcomed Brexit secretary Davis Davis ‘to hell’. Perhaps his words were more prescient than even he imagined, as one of the EU’s first casualties of 2017 was Great Britain’s representative to the Union, Sir Ivan Rogers. The man charged with negotiating as painless a divorce as possible left with what may transpire to be an ominous warning on “muddled thinking”. Closely following this came a statement by the British Prime Minister which seems to indicate a more bitter separation than originally imagined. Regardless of when Mrs May triggers Article 50 (“when”, not “whether”, as the latter would be at the risk of national rioting and the overnight evaporation of public faith in British democracy), neither Britain nor Europe is prepared for an exit within two years. Current indications suggest that negotiating Britain’s exit could take a decade. Assuming that there is still a European Union to leave in the mid to late 2020s, the painful, dragged-out negotiations of Brexit and the continued possibility that the first country to leave the EU will suffer severe economic decline, EU policymakers and anti-EU politicians in Europe may look to Britain and realise, respectively, that the Union needs urgent and substantial reform and that withdrawal has long-term national disadvantages which outweigh the short-term party advantages of winning a few years in office. But in 2017, Brexit is no longer the dominant issue. While the British – whether Leave or Remain – might imagine that they are the EU’s main talking point, it is clear that in the minds of EU policymakers and administrators, the British and their internal squabbles are a sideshow. Another financial crisis, in a crumbling Eurozone which cannot be propped up forever, is not only inevitable but imminent. The shaky deal between a Union scrambling to shore up its borders and a Turkish Republic rapidly sliding towards authoritarianism appears increasingly untenable. If Recip Erdogan reneges on the deal Europe will likely experience a second Migration Crisis which, in a year of border fortifications and mutual mistrust between populations and politicians, will make 2014 pale in comparison. And while there is hope of a significant thawing in relations between the White House and the Kremlin in the wake of Mr Trump’s inauguration, a geopolitical vacuum following the imminent defeat of Islamic State and the continuing weakness of the Russian Federation’s economy present new urgencies and opportunities for Mr Putin to cling onto power through further foreign meddling. The recent arrival into Eastern Europe of large contingents of American armour indicates that Europe may face a new standoff against Russia. These are gloomy predictions, but 2016 was a gloomy year. Is there sufficient reason to believe that 2017 will be different? All in all, much to think and write about. We aim to provide you with our own reflections, but we will strongly welcome guest contributions from others. If you are interested in writing a piece for this blog, don’t hesitate to write to us! We are interested in all aspects of Brexit, from its significance in Scotland and its fallout in EU nations, to its portrayal in media and its impact on those academic libraries on which many readers of this blog so urgently depend. 2017 will be a testing year for Europe, so make your voice heard! More details on how to submit ideas or posts are available here. Wishing you all the best for 2017! This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 14 December 2016 The stream of news related to the forthcoming British withdrawal from the EU isn’t likely to dry up anytime soon. Being a scholar who is interested in media and Euroscepticism, one piece of news caught my attention. On 29 November, several British media – for instance, The Independent – reported that News Group Newspapers, the company that owns The Sun and The Times, had had to register as a campaign group, following a Brexit poster campaign initiated by The Sun. More than 96,000 pounds was spent on a ‘BeLEAVE in Britain’ poster (Interesting detail: The Times favoured Bremain).
The anti-European stance of parts of the British press is, of course, rather well documented. For instance, in an article published in 2012 Oliver Daddow wrote that the rhetoric of the British press emphasises ‘destructive dissent’ based on perceived ‘threats to British sovereignty and identity’ originating from a German-run continent. And last year Nick Startin explained how the tabloid press in particular have played a key role in the radicalisation of the British EU debate, having had a clear impact on the framing of (debates about) the EU. In fact, a recent study by Press Gazette found that a clear majority of the readers of four of the national newspapers that most vocally favoured a Brexit – the Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph and The Sun – voted for Britain to leave the EU. Stereotypes commonly occur in the British press and are an important source for misinterpretation of European politics. Such unbalanced reporting goes at the expense of people’s opportunities to inform themselves about the EU. While this certainly also occurs in other EU states, the British media system differs in that newspapers in particular tend to be much more vocal and politically outspoken than in many other European countries. Nonetheless, it is common practice to proclaim that ‘the media’ across Europe are negative about politics and Eurosceptic in their outlook towards the EU. Yet, there are two problems here: the illusiveness of Euroscepticism and the relatively small body of research on media and Euroscepticism. The first problem concerns the rather abstract notion of ‘Euroscepticism’, which tends to be used in different contexts, often without clarifying what it actually entails. In her book Understanding Euroscepticism, Cécile Leconte calls Euroscepticism a ‘plastic notion’. Similarly, Simon Usherwood refers to it as a ‘reductive term’. In yet to be published research, I found that there is a much broader variety of criticism towards the EU as covered by the media, than tends to be assumed. For instance, when policies are criticised for the choices made (e.g. austerity vs. investment), but without denying the need for EU involvement. Yet, at the same time media reporting of EU affairs often reduces – to borrow from Usherwood – it to an anti-European stance, disregarding the broader spectrum of perspectives. This then brings me to the second problem: the existing body of literature on Euroscepticism mostly focusses on political parties and public opinion and has only recently broadened its scope. New research reveals that critical debates about the EU often have a transnational dimension. In addition, new media research shows that the multi-faced nature of Euroscepticism is also increasingly reflected in different types of media. For instance, Charlotte Galpin, Ben Leruth and I are currently in the process of writing up a paper in which we’ve looked into how Brexit was covered by centre-right newspapers in France, Germany and the Netherlands. What emerges, is a increasingly shared discourse in which initial understanding for British calls for reforms gradually is replaced by a debate framed in terms of ‘us’ (EU27) versus ‘them’ (Britain). Based on these two points, I believe that we should be careful when referring to ‘the media’ in the context of debates about Brexit and Euroscepticism. Media systems across Europe are different, as is the degree of criticism towards the EU. While I agree with my fellow curator Russell Foster that Brexit “must be understood as merely one symptom of a much broader problem”, this should not mean that we equate Euroscepticism with anti-Europeanism. Instead, we should actually make sure to aim for a more encompassing understanding of the variety of critical and oppositional opinions towards the EU and its policies. This is not to say that there is no ground to criticise the EU – far from it! The democratic nature of EU decision-making and the resulting policy choices could be (and should be) critically discussed. Yet, as I wrote in my previous post, support for the EU went up post-Brexit. In fact, in the recent rerun of the Austrian presidential elections, newly elected President Alexander van der Bellen campaigned on a pro-European ticket and, against all odds, beat Eurosceptic candidate Norbert Hofer with a bigger margin than earlier this year. This alone may not be enough to save the EU, but it certainly emphasises the need – as argued by Cas Mudde – to put things in ‘proper perspective’ and steer away from a (self-fulfilling?) story in which ‘the people’ or ‘the media’ are against the EU. This post was originally published by CERiM on 8 December 2016 Brexit, the Eurozone and refugee crises, and increased criticism on globalisation have shed doubts about the future of European integration. This certainly isn’t the first time that the European Union (EU) is going through a crisis, nor is it the first time that European integration is questioned. But, this mood seems to be more acute than ever before. This also presents challenges for teaching European Studies.
The rationale for studying European Studies The livelihood of any programme in higher education depends on its ability to attract new students. Yet, recently current and prospective students have been asking questions about the need to continue studying Europe. For instance, during Politico’s Harry Cooper’s recent Jean Monnet Lecture on 13 October 2016, an audience member asked whether he had made a good choice by opting for our BA in European Studies. I don’t think that a total collapse of the EU is very likely. The EU – including all its pros and cons – has become an integral part of political and even public life in Europe. Criticism of the EU tends to be equated to being anti-EU, yet often doesn’t concern its existence as such, but rather what it does (and doesn’t!) do. Several post-Brexit polls have actually shown that support for the EU has increased since. European Studies transcends disciplinary boundaries, helping us to better understand contemporary developments such as Brexit. It does so in an international context, with the majority of students and staff being non-Dutch, thus allowing for different national perspectives to be brought in. Perhaps even more importantly, students acquire knowledge and skills that allow them to continue studying in a variety of fields – in fact, many do and most of our alumni actually don’t end up working in Brussels. Keeping European Studies up-to-date The fact that there are more generic reasons why studying European Studies still makes sense, doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t adapt our programmes to take into account the ever-changing context in which we teach. Having been programme director myself, I know that keeping programmes up-to-date is time consuming and challenging, having to take into account final qualifications, teaching and exam regulation, etc. But, there are other ways in which we can address the contemporary issues that students want to learn about and discuss. First, Maastricht University prides itself on its use of Problem-Based Learning (PBL). In its purest sense, PBL assumes that we don’t provide students with reading lists, but that they search for literature themselves, based on gaps in their knowledge. Even when literature is given, PBL allows for critical discussions that extend beyond that literature. So, when applied properly, PBL offers many opportunities to bring in contemporary developments. A second way in which we can address the need to adapt to contemporary developments, is by stressing extra-curricular events that can help to establish a link between what we teach and the everyday reality of Europe. Within Maastricht, this includes the events organised by CERiM, which have focussed on all kinds of contemporary issues, but also lectures and debates organised by Studium Generale or the city and province. What’s next? European Studies student Kerstin Spath recently wrote in the university newspaper Observant that “the EU offers us so much. So why can’t it just stay like that?” The EU will, of course, change post-Brexit (as international students in the UK are already experiencing), but it is also likely to stay. And if it doesn’t we could always consider changing to European Disintegration Studies, in which we will address the question “what on earth went wrong with the EU?”! This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 16 November 2016 This is the first full post for E-International Relations’ blog section ‘Brexit: A European Perspective’. And although we did not plan it that way, it could not have come at a better time, because on 3 November dictionary publisher Collins announced that ‘Brexit’ is named Word of the Year 2016.
Defined as ‘the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union’, I think we can all agree – whether for or against the EU – that the outcome of the referendum held on 23rd June 2016 will have a profound effect on the future of Europe and of the UK. But with Donald Trump’s victory in the US just a few days ago, we may also ask whether ‘Brexit’ is the rightful winner. In fact, when you scroll down the list published by Collins, you’ll find that ‘Trumpism’ was another contender. Even Nigel Farage called Trump’s win ‘bigger than Brexit’! In any case, after the UK’s vote to leave the EU and the Americans’ choice for ‘The Donald’ to become the 45th President of the United States of America, I assume that ‘the people’ stand a good chance of being named Time‘s Person of the Year. They would then succeed Angela Merkel, who won last year ‘for providing steadfast moral leadership in a world where it is in short supply’ and who, incidentally, was called ‘insane’ by Trump. Oh, the irony… While many Europeans may have been quite shocked by Trump’s victory, Eurosceptics across Europe seem to perceive it as a boost for their own politics. Front National’s Marine Le Pen was among the first to congratulate Trump with his win, while Frauke Petry, leader of the Alternatieve für Deutschland (AfD; Alternative for Germany), tweeted that the Americans had opted for a new start. Dutch populist Geert Wilderscalled Trump’s victory an historic one and declared that he and his Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV; Party for Freedom) would, too, ‘give our country back to the Dutch!’. Politico has been publishing very actively on the issue. Nicholas Vinocur wrote that Europe’s populists are talking about a new world order, ‘one in which national sovereignty beats international agreements, in which immigration is kept to a minimum, and in which alliances that have existed for decades no longer hold sway.’ And Harry Cooper has done some nice work for those interested in European politics, presenting ‘a calendar of possible populist victories’ in Europe’s near future. For my part, I am not just randomly mentioning Le Pen, Petry and Wilders. Le Pen will be aiming for the French presidency in April and May of next year, the AfD hopes to win its first ever seats in the Bundestag, and Wilders’ PVV is hoping to become the biggest Dutch party in the March 2017 general elections. Successful results for these Eurosceptic parties in all three founding members of the EU is quite likely. While one could imagine that Merkel will still be in charge a year from now, Hollande definitely seems to be a lost cause. Even when Le Pen does not win, there’s still former President Nicolas Sarkozy, who’s become more critical about the EU than before. Meanwhile, for what it’s worth, polls suggest that Wilders might come in second in the Dutch elections – after having been in the lead until not so long ago. In fact, there are some who think that ‘Brexit’ and ‘Trumpism’ may actually increase support for the EU, such as Mario Monti, who discussed further European defence cooperation on BBC Radio 4 the day after the American elections. This then takes me back to the start of this blog post, to ‘Brexit’ and ‘Trumpism’ and to the question what will become the Word of the Year 2017? ‘Frexit’, ‘Nexit’ or maybe back to ‘ever closer union’? I wish I knew. I have become a bit hesitant to make predictions since I was a panellist in a debate on Brexit just before 23 June and argued how I thought Brexit was not going to happen… (Neither did I really expect Trump to win – even though I was less convinced.) In any case, there is no doubt that next year’s going to be another interesting one as far as European politics is concerned. Is it possible that, despite increased support for the EU in quite a few Member States after Brexit, other Europeans will be susceptible for a similar path? No doubt an issue that we will further look into in this blog section. To be continued! |
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