Originally published by Ideas on Europe on 12 October 2023: https://jcms.ideasoneurope.eu/2023/10/12/what-is-actually-being-mainstreamed-in-the-mainstreaming-of-euroscepticism/ In recent decades criticism on the European Union (EU) and even the complete dismissal of European integration – a range of positions generally grouped under the umbrella term ‘Euroscepticism’ – have gained ground. Euroscepticism has become mainstream, as “it has become increasingly more legitimate and salient (and in many ways less contested) across Europe as a whole” (Brack & Startin, 2015, p. 240). Events such as referendums and European Parliament (EP) elections provide a particularly good opportunity for Eurosceptic movements to mobilise (Usherwood, 2017). In my recent Journal of Common Market Studies article, I look at the mainstreaming of Euroscepticism by studying the coverage of EP election debates in the Netherlands in 2009, 2014 and 2019. I examine mainstreaming through a two-part qualitative analysis that centres around a fourfold typology, which distinguishes between supportive, Euroalternative, soft Eurosceptic and hard Eurosceptic claims (Table 1). Here, I build on the concepts of soft and hard Euroscepticism developed by Taggart and Szczerbiak. Yet, by introducing ‘Euroalternativism’, I avoid soft Euroscepticism’s catch-all nature. Euroalternativism implies criticism towards (elements of) EU policies or its institutional design that is essentially supportive of the EU and European integration (FitzGibbon, 2013). I also add support for the existing nature of the EU and its policies to my categorisation, so as to take into account the “complex interaction among competing pro-integration narratives and counter-narratives to European union” (McMahon & Kaiser, 2022, p. 1). Finally, I further refine the categorisation by distinguishing between statements regarding (I) the EU polity (its political system and its institutions) and (II) EU policies. There has been relatively less attention for mass media in the study of Euroscepticism, which is surprising given their central role in contemporary European democracies (Caiani & Guerra, 2017). Furthermore, most existing research has taken a quantitative perspective, whereas scholars have argued that a qualitative approach focussing on discourses and narratives is more suitable for achieving an encompassing understanding of Euroscepticism’s changing meaning and importance (Leconte, 2015). Indeed, as Brown et al. illustrate what is and what is not mainstream in the public sphere is prone to change because ideas change through debates in that same public sphere. The first part of my analysis consists of a manual coding of EU-related claims by actors in three newspapers – De Telegraaf, De Volkskrant and NRC Handelsblad – that play a central role in the Dutch mediated public sphere. The analysis of claims focusses on two essential elements of a claim, namely, ‘who’ (the claimant) and ‘what’ (the subject of the claim), plus on determining the assessment of EU affairs through a close reading of the wording (Koopmans & Statham, 2010). The second part of the analysis zooms out again to place the claims analysis in the context of the wider EP election debates in the Dutch public sphere. Hence, in contrast to the first part of the analysis that follows a pre-established categorisation, the second part looks at the overall story and the key themes as present in the material analysed. In total I analysed 3148 claims. Figure 1 presents an overview of the way in which the EU and its policies were discussed in the Dutch-mediated debate on the EP elections. Despite some differences between the three mediated debates, it becomes clear that supportive claims are least prominent. Instead, criticism of and opposition to the EU has become widespread, whether essentially supportive or fundamentally Eurosceptic; because, while representing “pro-system opposition” (FitzGibbon, 2013), Euroalternative claims are still a form of criticism on the EU. As such, Figure 1 suggests that Euroscepticism has indeed become mainstream; that it is at the centre of the debates in the Dutch public sphere. Yet, it comes in different guises, namely, Euroalternative, soft Eurosceptic and hard Eurosceptic claims. Building on this, the second part of the analysis calls for an even more nuanced assessment and puts forward three key points.
First, during the three EP elections, Euroscepticism in its various guises was specifically mainstreamed in a debate that concerned the pros and cons of integration, with limited attention for policies. This illustrates that there is an interplay between pro-con narratives, as suggested by McMahon and Kaiser (2022). Second, what is being mainstreamed still amounts to a vague notion of Euroscepticism. As such, we may ask what Euroscepticism was being mainstreamed? For instance, in an article in De Volkskrant on 5 June 2009, the ongoing campaign was said to be “governed by Euroscepticism”, while it simultaneously referred to a “Eurocritical wave” and the “anti-European camp”. Third, at the same time, the place of Eurosceptics in the debate gradually changes, turning them from outsiders into insiders. Eurosceptics’ existence is no longer merely observed and noted, but they are increasingly treated as equal and legitimate actors in the EU debate. Brexit may have mattered here, as the hard edges of Euroscepticism have at least partly withered away (cf. de Vries, 2018). In essence then, my article illustrates that the statement that Euroscepticism has become mainstream is partly a simplification of a development in which criticism of and opposition to the EU are prone to change. Even focussing on EP elections alone creates problems, as they skew debates toward issues of integration – in some of my other work, I find that day-to-day EU debates focus on policies and policy alternatives. It is therefore important that we continue to treat the term ‘Euroscepticism’ with caution. In fact, perhaps we need to even go one step further and, paraphrasing Ophir (2018), ought to ask ourselves ‘what kind of concept is Euroscepticism?’. In other words, shouldn’t researchers in the field of Euroscepticism consider re-launching the conceptual debate? Obviously, this is not an easy challenge. Yet, it exactly this conceptual puzzle that I am currently exploring with my colleague Luca Mancin and we are looking forward to sharing our thoughts at a conference near you soon!
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This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 14 December 2016 The stream of news related to the forthcoming British withdrawal from the EU isn’t likely to dry up anytime soon. Being a scholar who is interested in media and Euroscepticism, one piece of news caught my attention. On 29 November, several British media – for instance, The Independent – reported that News Group Newspapers, the company that owns The Sun and The Times, had had to register as a campaign group, following a Brexit poster campaign initiated by The Sun. More than 96,000 pounds was spent on a ‘BeLEAVE in Britain’ poster (Interesting detail: The Times favoured Bremain).
The anti-European stance of parts of the British press is, of course, rather well documented. For instance, in an article published in 2012 Oliver Daddow wrote that the rhetoric of the British press emphasises ‘destructive dissent’ based on perceived ‘threats to British sovereignty and identity’ originating from a German-run continent. And last year Nick Startin explained how the tabloid press in particular have played a key role in the radicalisation of the British EU debate, having had a clear impact on the framing of (debates about) the EU. In fact, a recent study by Press Gazette found that a clear majority of the readers of four of the national newspapers that most vocally favoured a Brexit – the Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph and The Sun – voted for Britain to leave the EU. Stereotypes commonly occur in the British press and are an important source for misinterpretation of European politics. Such unbalanced reporting goes at the expense of people’s opportunities to inform themselves about the EU. While this certainly also occurs in other EU states, the British media system differs in that newspapers in particular tend to be much more vocal and politically outspoken than in many other European countries. Nonetheless, it is common practice to proclaim that ‘the media’ across Europe are negative about politics and Eurosceptic in their outlook towards the EU. Yet, there are two problems here: the illusiveness of Euroscepticism and the relatively small body of research on media and Euroscepticism. The first problem concerns the rather abstract notion of ‘Euroscepticism’, which tends to be used in different contexts, often without clarifying what it actually entails. In her book Understanding Euroscepticism, Cécile Leconte calls Euroscepticism a ‘plastic notion’. Similarly, Simon Usherwood refers to it as a ‘reductive term’. In yet to be published research, I found that there is a much broader variety of criticism towards the EU as covered by the media, than tends to be assumed. For instance, when policies are criticised for the choices made (e.g. austerity vs. investment), but without denying the need for EU involvement. Yet, at the same time media reporting of EU affairs often reduces – to borrow from Usherwood – it to an anti-European stance, disregarding the broader spectrum of perspectives. This then brings me to the second problem: the existing body of literature on Euroscepticism mostly focusses on political parties and public opinion and has only recently broadened its scope. New research reveals that critical debates about the EU often have a transnational dimension. In addition, new media research shows that the multi-faced nature of Euroscepticism is also increasingly reflected in different types of media. For instance, Charlotte Galpin, Ben Leruth and I are currently in the process of writing up a paper in which we’ve looked into how Brexit was covered by centre-right newspapers in France, Germany and the Netherlands. What emerges, is a increasingly shared discourse in which initial understanding for British calls for reforms gradually is replaced by a debate framed in terms of ‘us’ (EU27) versus ‘them’ (Britain). Based on these two points, I believe that we should be careful when referring to ‘the media’ in the context of debates about Brexit and Euroscepticism. Media systems across Europe are different, as is the degree of criticism towards the EU. While I agree with my fellow curator Russell Foster that Brexit “must be understood as merely one symptom of a much broader problem”, this should not mean that we equate Euroscepticism with anti-Europeanism. Instead, we should actually make sure to aim for a more encompassing understanding of the variety of critical and oppositional opinions towards the EU and its policies. This is not to say that there is no ground to criticise the EU – far from it! The democratic nature of EU decision-making and the resulting policy choices could be (and should be) critically discussed. Yet, as I wrote in my previous post, support for the EU went up post-Brexit. In fact, in the recent rerun of the Austrian presidential elections, newly elected President Alexander van der Bellen campaigned on a pro-European ticket and, against all odds, beat Eurosceptic candidate Norbert Hofer with a bigger margin than earlier this year. This alone may not be enough to save the EU, but it certainly emphasises the need – as argued by Cas Mudde – to put things in ‘proper perspective’ and steer away from a (self-fulfilling?) story in which ‘the people’ or ‘the media’ are against the EU. |
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