Originally published by the DCU Brexit Blog on 19 January 2022. After a record 271 days of negotiations a new Dutch coalition government took office on Monday 10 January. Although, is it really new? The same four parties that formed the previous government – Christian-Democratic CDA, Christian CU, Social-Liberal D66 and Conservative-Liberal VVD – are also in the new government. Yet, it does come with many new faces and plans. This includes what is at first sight a rather different approach towards the EU.
In the recent past the Netherlands has become known as a reluctant EU member, particularly following ‘Black Monday’ in 1991, when an ambitious Dutch blueprint for a federal Europe was rejected, and the Dutch ‘No’ to the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, partly due to increased dissatisfaction with the pace and extent of European integration. Whether the Dutch ever were passionate believers in European integration before that time, may be questioned. But the country having become known as a member of the ‘New Hanseatic League’ and one of the ‘Frugal Four’ (for an insightful study, see here), it seemed almost like it had become a UK lite, stepping into the gap that occurred after Brexit to become perhaps the most Eurosceptic member of the EU. It therefore may come as a surprise that the new coalition agreement reads that “The Netherlands will play a leading role in making the EU more effective, economically stronger, greener and more secure.” But there’s more.
Of course, the proof is in the pudding; these are words on paper and reality may be quite different. But, as Rem Korteweg of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael also noted in a recent Twitter thread, some of the wording of the Dutch coalition agreement is quite similar to that of the new German government. Unlike the German government, the Dutch are not calling for a federal EU. But with the French and the Germans now seeing eye-to-eye on a number of EU reforms, the similarity between the two coalition agreements suggests that the new Dutch government may have become a Germany lite that will no longer put a break on the further development of the EU.
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This blog was originally published by the DCU Brexit Institute on 24 June 2021. If there is one thing that has become clear during the long years of Brexit negotiations between the EU and the UK, it is that the EU27 – despite their differences – were able to act in a united way when it came to negotiating with a soon-to-be third country. Highlighting the perks of membership has played a role in this. In her 2019 JCMS Annual Review lecture, Brigid Laffan also argued that one of the EU’s strategic goals in this process was “to affirm the Union’s dominance in governing transnational relations in Europe.”
Yet, the two sides continue to haggle about their divorce. While the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement came into force on 1 May 2021, the ongoing discussions about the status of Northern Ireland show that Brexit by no means is a done deal. The divorce came with an agreement to maintain an open border between Ireland and Northern Ireland to uphold the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Yet, the UK already wants to alter this Protocol as it comes with checks on British goods entering Northern Ireland, effectively creating a border within the UK. In the context of the recent G7 summit, UK Brexit negotiator David Frost even attended a meeting wearing Union Jack socks in a not-so-subtle message for the EU. Whereas the Europeans continue to take a tough negotiating stance affirming their trust in rule-based international relations, the British approach to Northern Ireland might tempt others into trying to get out of existing agreements. If it is so (relatively) easy to undermine an agreement with the EU, wouldn’t other non-EU European countries be willing to do so too? Two recent developments are worth discussing in this context. First, in late May Switzerland pulled out of negotiations on a detailed partnership agreement with the EU. EU-Swiss relationships have never been straightforward, as illustrated by a range of referendums that had a (potential) impact on dealings between the two. For instance, only in September last year the Swiss rejected a proposal on ending the free movement agreement with the EU in a referendum that “echoed the Brexit vote”, according to The Guardian. The partnership agreements, negotiations on which have been going in since 2014, were partly an attempt to reduce uncertainty by means of an encompassing agreement that would replace the many existing bilateral agreements. Like in the case of Brexit, here too the debate revolves around the Swiss wanting exemptions from rules that the EU wants to uphold. Foreign Policy columnist Caroline de Gruyter has even called Switzerland the “next big problem” for the EU. A second example relates to reports that Norwegian opposition parties may want to renegotiate the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement should they get into government. Like Switzerland, Norway may not be an EU member, but it is closely tight to the EU through an intricate web of rules. While the Norwegians voted against EU membership on two occasions in 1972 and 1994, the current situation has been less controversial. While agriculture and fisheries remain divisive issues, relations with the EU overall remain quite well. Indeed, reflecting on potential similarities with Brexit, John Erik Fossum and Joachim Vigrestad argue that it is unlikely that Norwegian politicians would want to jeopardise relations with the EU. In their view, “the sheer size and magnitude of the EU–Norway power asymmetry” is acknowledged and shapes the Norwegian debate. Relations between the EU and Norway might be said to differ from those with Switzerland by being more firmly established through the EEA. Yet, recent debates in both countries show that relations with the EU are not uncontested. Brexit may even have put a new spotlight on these debates. Yet, the question is how committed critics are to really change relations with the EU, especially given the economic benefits they have been enjoying so far. In any case, it is likely that they will encounter an EU that is committed to a united and robust negotiating stance. There is a continued need to reaffirm the value of full membership vis-à-vis ties with the EU as a third country. And while the continuing Brexit saga may heighten hopes in some countries that a new relationship with the EU is possible, it is also likely to reaffirm the EU’s commitment to rule-based relations. This blog was first published by the DCU Brexit Blog on 23 April 2020. A few months back I read Anu Bradford’s much-debated article ‘The Brussels Effect’. Her main argument: through its stringent regulations the EU has set standards for countries across the world, shaping polices on a wide range of issues, from chemicals to privacy. Bradford has elaborated on the argument in a recently published book.
During recent weeks, I had to think about Bradford’s arguments again, mainly because commentators and politicians are once again proclaiming the end of the EU due to internal divisions and its indecisiveness regarding the ongoing Covid-19 crisis. This is not the first time that the EU has been carried to the grave because of a crisis. In fact, as Davis Cross and Ma nicely show in their 2015 article ‘EU crises and integrational panic: The role of the media’, each crisis the EU is confronted with is quickly turned into an existential challenge. The Eurozone crisis? Check The migration crisis? Check Brexit? Check At first sight, the EU does indeed appear to be in troubled waters. It has been unable to coordinate health policy responses and related decisions in light of Covid-19 and member states have been endlessly bickering about economic support measures. Indeed, being Dutch and living just 2.5 KMs from the Belgian border, it is easy to see some truth to this crisis rhetoric. For one, I had never thought that I would see border fences being erected at the end of my street. But also when following EU news, the Dutch position on how the EU should deal with the crisis is not exactly painted as a constructive and supportive one. But let’s look at this new crisis in a bit more detail. And in particular at the economic policy response, because, let’s face it: the member states are primarily responsible for health policy, which may largely explain their unconcerted panic reactions (which does not mean that there are no lessons to be learned here). The economic response rests on the Commission’s policy response as well as on member states’ agreement regarding financial measures. The Commission has been pursuing a policy of more flexibility regarding state aid to allow member states to deal with economic uncertainties. It has also launched the so-called instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE). This instrument is meant to help protect jobs and employees affected by the current crisis by allowing for EU financial assistance to member states through billions of euros of loans from the Commission to member states. The EU finance ministers also recently agreed on a substantial support package, which includes use of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The new multi-annual budget may play a role here as well. Yet, some challenges and questions remain unresolved, with Eurobonds being the most controversial issue (and dating back to the Eurozone crisis). It is also expected that more money will be needed – even up to 1 trillion more, according to Economy Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni. In other words, there has not (yet?) been a ‘Brussels effect’ during the current crisis and there are certainly grounds to criticise the EU’s response to Covid-19 – for a slow reaction, a lack of coordination, and so on. Yet, we should also not forget that these are extraordinary circumstances. Countries across the world have struggled to come up with a good response. And the EU has only seldomly been the first to react to extraordinary circumstances. So, will the current response be sufficient? Probably not. But does that mean that the EU’s end is near? Probably not either. It is more likely that the EU will muddle through this crisis, just like it did at the time of previous crises. Meanwhile, take care of yourselves and your loved ones. #bloggingfromhome This blog was originally published by the DCU Brexit Blog on 12 December 2019. Finally. Jean-Claude Juncker has bid us ‘au revoir’ via his own edition of the Politico Playbook and the new Von der Leyen Commission started earlier this month. Things didn’t go as smoothly as some had hoped, with the European Parliament blocking three of the candidate Commissioners (László Trócsányi, Hungary; Rovana Plumb, Romania; Sylvie Goulard, France). But VDL and her team have set to work – as have new European Council president Charles Michel and new European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde.
A few months back I reflected on the incoming European Commission in another DCU Brexit post. The game of musical chairs has gone at the expense of the much-hoped gender balance in the VDL Commission – although, as this picture tweeted by Charles Michel shows, EU leadership has generally become quite a bit more balanced! Another difference is that the Commission is no longer ‘Protecting our European Way of Life’ but rather ‘Promoting’ it. Although we still don’t know what ‘Our European Way of Life’ is exactly, the Commission’s website does raise questions about how ‘fundamental rights’ and ‘strong borders’ will be combined. But let’s give VDL and her team a chance and, instead, look at what will be coming her way in the near future. Here are three feature films coming to European cinemas soon! 1. Spitzenkandidaten, Part Deux One issue that I wrote about in more detail in my previous DCU post, concerned the EU’s democratic nature and the need for treaty changes. So, what can we expect from the Commission here? Not too much, probably, as the member states will be in the lead. But the recent Franco-German non-paper on the EU’s future suggests that discussions will certainly affect future Commissions. The document refers to the need “to promote democracy and European values and to ensure a more efficient functioning of the Union and its Institutions.” Vintage back to the future rhetoric. But interestingly, the paper also directly refers to “transnational lists and lead candidate system”. This suggests that the Parliament’s much-loved Spitzenkandidaten system seems to have now been accepted by Macron and Merkel as the way forward. And that new voting arrangements for European elections may even be on the agenda. Can’t wait until the 2024 European elections! 2. Climate Wars: The Return of the Jedi This week the new (and returning) executive vice-President of the Commission, Frans Timmermans, will present the contours of the Union’s new Green Deal to the European Parliament. Given that Parliament has declared a state of climate emergency, questions will certainly be asked. Some of the ideas that have made it to European media, have already been heavily criticised by environmental groups. Meanwhile, European businesses and EU leaders – the latter being confronted with protests against environmental legislation at home – may want plans to be less ambitious. Finding a compromise between these different interests will be a mammoth task and an important one at that. But, given that Frans Timmermans has taken on the beard of a wise Jedi Knight, the force may be strong with this one. Script and soundtrack have already been leaked! 3. Monty Python and the Holy Brexit The British elections are just around the corner. And perhaps Brexit is too. The Conservatives are in the lead in the opinion polls, though this does not necessarily mean that they will win a majority of seats. Labour would hold a new referendum on Brexit, should they win the elections, whereas the LibDems would revoke Article 50 to stop Brexit altogether. Neither of them really stands a chance of gaining a majority, though, but being part of a coalition would also put Brexit into question. If Boris’ Conservatives win a majority, the British leaving the EU will be a matter of weeks. But even if Boris takes the win and Britain leaves the EU, this will only be the start of determining what their future relationship will look like. And will the EU27 remain as unified when having to negotiate a trade deal with the UK? And if Boris doesn’t win, we may be back to where we were a few months back. And the months before that. And last year… So, if you’re in the Commission, always look on the bright side of life: you’ll still be talking about EU-UK for quite a while! Brexit, climate change, the future of the EU? It’s back to the future with the new Commission, with three challenges that are likely to stay. Turns out that Jean-Claude Juncker truly understands European politics best: rather than saying ‘goodbye’, we should say ‘au revoir’. This post was originally published by the DCU Brexit Institute Blog on 3 October 2019. It already seems ages ago that we had the kick-off of the European election campaign here in Maastricht on 29 April. The Maastricht Debate, as it was called, brought together the Spitzenkandidaten of five of the European party groups. The most prominent absentee was EPP Spitzenkandidat Manfred Weber, who attended a birthday party instead. His absence did lead to speculation as to whether or not this was the real reason for his absence, one of the suggestions put forward being that this may be a sign of the EPP hoping to demote the Spitzenkandidaten system.
Nearly five months later and the Spitzenkandidaten system indeed seems to be more death than alive. French President Macron’s opposition to the system in absence of transnational lists was important, even though Europe’s leaders have never been a fan of the idea. But the new Commission President-elect, Ursula von der Leyen (VDL), at least is a member of the biggest party group, the EPP. Earlier this month VDL presented the proposed team of Commissioners and their portfolios. The European Parliament is now gearing up for its hearings of the European Commission nominees, starting on Monday 30 September. The fact that the number of women in the Commission has gone up so substantially – from 8 to 13 – certainly is great news. But the composition of the new Commission has already led to some debate and commentators are speculating on who will not survive the hearings in Parliament. Questions have also been raised about what will happen to the Commission’s tough stance on the rule of law in Hungary and Poland when Frans Timmermans is no longer in charge. And then there are the lofty and sometimes unclear titles of some of the portfolios, such as ‘An Economy that Works for People’, ‘Democracy and Demography’, ‘International Partnerships’ and, of course, the new post of Commissioner for ‘Protecting our European Way of Life’. These questions and issues are important, and we should applaud the fact that the European Parliament takes its democratic duty seriously and will be critically assessing these questions and issues during its hearings of the Commission candidates. But what seems to be less debated right now, but arguably has become more important than ever, are questions about the future of Europe. In particular, although the expected Eurosceptic surge was more modest than many had anticipated and election turn-out has gone up, questions about Europe’s democratic arrangements remain relevant. If and when the debate about the future of the EU continues, two questions regarding its institutional set-up need to be addressed. The first concerns the role and composition of the European Commission. Is the Commission meant to be a bureaucratic actor, the composition of which should not depend on election outcomes? Or should it become a nascent European government, in which case its composition should depend on those elections? Linked to this is the matter of the size of the Commission, which is not a new question at all, but one that deserves further discussion given that some of the new posts again seem to amount to a rather limited job description. The second question concerns the European elections themselves. Whether or not the Commission is seen as a bureaucratic or a political actor, isn’t it time that transnational election lists finally become reality? While citizens would still be able to elect national politicians, transnational lists might push politicians to move beyond their national focus, which would deepen the transnational European public sphere. What’s more, it might further increase the quality of MEPs, because we could vote for more experienced politicians – former prime ministers even – when our national political parties choose to nominate less experienced or frankly outlandish candidates. However important, right now it doesn’t seem that these issues will be addressed in the short run. If only because some fear that they will open a box of pandora when it comes to EU reform. But there also still is this one issue that hasn’t been resolved yet (and that I’ve managed to avoid so far): Brexit. Until Brexit happens – or is off the table completely? – the debate about the EU’s future will remain low-key. But Europe will have to move on, with or without our British friends. |
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