Originally published by Ideas on Europe on 12 October 2023: https://jcms.ideasoneurope.eu/2023/10/12/what-is-actually-being-mainstreamed-in-the-mainstreaming-of-euroscepticism/ In recent decades criticism on the European Union (EU) and even the complete dismissal of European integration – a range of positions generally grouped under the umbrella term ‘Euroscepticism’ – have gained ground. Euroscepticism has become mainstream, as “it has become increasingly more legitimate and salient (and in many ways less contested) across Europe as a whole” (Brack & Startin, 2015, p. 240). Events such as referendums and European Parliament (EP) elections provide a particularly good opportunity for Eurosceptic movements to mobilise (Usherwood, 2017). In my recent Journal of Common Market Studies article, I look at the mainstreaming of Euroscepticism by studying the coverage of EP election debates in the Netherlands in 2009, 2014 and 2019. I examine mainstreaming through a two-part qualitative analysis that centres around a fourfold typology, which distinguishes between supportive, Euroalternative, soft Eurosceptic and hard Eurosceptic claims (Table 1). Here, I build on the concepts of soft and hard Euroscepticism developed by Taggart and Szczerbiak. Yet, by introducing ‘Euroalternativism’, I avoid soft Euroscepticism’s catch-all nature. Euroalternativism implies criticism towards (elements of) EU policies or its institutional design that is essentially supportive of the EU and European integration (FitzGibbon, 2013). I also add support for the existing nature of the EU and its policies to my categorisation, so as to take into account the “complex interaction among competing pro-integration narratives and counter-narratives to European union” (McMahon & Kaiser, 2022, p. 1). Finally, I further refine the categorisation by distinguishing between statements regarding (I) the EU polity (its political system and its institutions) and (II) EU policies. There has been relatively less attention for mass media in the study of Euroscepticism, which is surprising given their central role in contemporary European democracies (Caiani & Guerra, 2017). Furthermore, most existing research has taken a quantitative perspective, whereas scholars have argued that a qualitative approach focussing on discourses and narratives is more suitable for achieving an encompassing understanding of Euroscepticism’s changing meaning and importance (Leconte, 2015). Indeed, as Brown et al. illustrate what is and what is not mainstream in the public sphere is prone to change because ideas change through debates in that same public sphere. The first part of my analysis consists of a manual coding of EU-related claims by actors in three newspapers – De Telegraaf, De Volkskrant and NRC Handelsblad – that play a central role in the Dutch mediated public sphere. The analysis of claims focusses on two essential elements of a claim, namely, ‘who’ (the claimant) and ‘what’ (the subject of the claim), plus on determining the assessment of EU affairs through a close reading of the wording (Koopmans & Statham, 2010). The second part of the analysis zooms out again to place the claims analysis in the context of the wider EP election debates in the Dutch public sphere. Hence, in contrast to the first part of the analysis that follows a pre-established categorisation, the second part looks at the overall story and the key themes as present in the material analysed. In total I analysed 3148 claims. Figure 1 presents an overview of the way in which the EU and its policies were discussed in the Dutch-mediated debate on the EP elections. Despite some differences between the three mediated debates, it becomes clear that supportive claims are least prominent. Instead, criticism of and opposition to the EU has become widespread, whether essentially supportive or fundamentally Eurosceptic; because, while representing “pro-system opposition” (FitzGibbon, 2013), Euroalternative claims are still a form of criticism on the EU. As such, Figure 1 suggests that Euroscepticism has indeed become mainstream; that it is at the centre of the debates in the Dutch public sphere. Yet, it comes in different guises, namely, Euroalternative, soft Eurosceptic and hard Eurosceptic claims. Building on this, the second part of the analysis calls for an even more nuanced assessment and puts forward three key points.
First, during the three EP elections, Euroscepticism in its various guises was specifically mainstreamed in a debate that concerned the pros and cons of integration, with limited attention for policies. This illustrates that there is an interplay between pro-con narratives, as suggested by McMahon and Kaiser (2022). Second, what is being mainstreamed still amounts to a vague notion of Euroscepticism. As such, we may ask what Euroscepticism was being mainstreamed? For instance, in an article in De Volkskrant on 5 June 2009, the ongoing campaign was said to be “governed by Euroscepticism”, while it simultaneously referred to a “Eurocritical wave” and the “anti-European camp”. Third, at the same time, the place of Eurosceptics in the debate gradually changes, turning them from outsiders into insiders. Eurosceptics’ existence is no longer merely observed and noted, but they are increasingly treated as equal and legitimate actors in the EU debate. Brexit may have mattered here, as the hard edges of Euroscepticism have at least partly withered away (cf. de Vries, 2018). In essence then, my article illustrates that the statement that Euroscepticism has become mainstream is partly a simplification of a development in which criticism of and opposition to the EU are prone to change. Even focussing on EP elections alone creates problems, as they skew debates toward issues of integration – in some of my other work, I find that day-to-day EU debates focus on policies and policy alternatives. It is therefore important that we continue to treat the term ‘Euroscepticism’ with caution. In fact, perhaps we need to even go one step further and, paraphrasing Ophir (2018), ought to ask ourselves ‘what kind of concept is Euroscepticism?’. In other words, shouldn’t researchers in the field of Euroscepticism consider re-launching the conceptual debate? Obviously, this is not an easy challenge. Yet, it exactly this conceptual puzzle that I am currently exploring with my colleague Luca Mancin and we are looking forward to sharing our thoughts at a conference near you soon!
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This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 20 March 2019. I have a confession to make: in the more than two years that we are now running this blog, Russell and I have actually never met in person! Russell has links with the Netherlands; and, even worse, I was in London twice during the last 5 months alone. But the closest that we came to meeting was during a recent episode of TRT World’s ‘Roundtable’ on Brexit, in which we both appeared – but in my case only via Skype. While Russell and I clearly need to work on our relationship, both of us appearing in the same programme also made me think about the role of experts in contemporary society.
According to the Oxford online dictionary an expert is “A person who is very knowledgeable about or skilful in a particular area.” Experts have gained an important role in society. They, for instance, are a key source of information for EU institutions and other administrative and political bodies. And although Michael Gove (in)famously claimed that people “have had enough of experts”, those same experts are continuously asked to comment on contemporary developments – both Russell and I have regularly been asked to comment on Brexit in media at local, regional, national and international level. Discussing the same topic during the same television programme creates an acute sense of awareness of your role as an expert. People expect us to say and write knowledgeable stuff, but maybe when it comes to Brexit we are also slowly running out of ammunition. Brexit is, of course, an unprecedented development. States and territories have left the EU and its predecessors before, or have left member-states and thus became non-members by default (Algeria became independent from France in 1962; Greenland, in 1985, and Saint Barthélemy, in 2012, withdrew to become so-called overseas countries and territories of the EU). And, let’s not forget, other countries decided to refrain from membership or withdrew their applications, such as Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Yet, his is the first time ever that a prominent member state is leaving the EU. Perhaps Brexit is not that much of a surprise given that Britain has always been an ‘awkward partner’, but it is difficult to predict what Brexit really means. Brexit means Brexit, right? But what will Brexit actually look like and what will be its consequences? Even we ‘experts’ don’t know anymore. Consider the many options that are now on the table, some which many people had not expected at all. There’s the EU-UK deal with the (in)famous ‘backstop’, which currently doesn’t receive enough support from either parliament nor the people on the street. Theresa May’s Plan B seems to be Plan A turned on its back, with the EU not willing to budge. And then there’s the no-deal Brexit scenario, which all but a few hard Brexiteers – those are among the Brexiteers with a “special place in hell” – seem to want to avoid. Even a no-Brexit scenario, although not very likely, is not completely of the table, certainly since calls for a second referendum or a general election are still out there. And then there’s the post-Brexit world. Even in a scenario where the EU and the UK agree to a deal after all, this is only the first step in setting up their future relationship. What will that relationship look like? And will the EU27 remain as unified as they currently are when having to negotiate a trade deal with the UK? We are charting new territory here. Experts answering these questions should perhaps say that we do not always know either. Mind you, I am not bored of Brexit and can surely speculate about it based on what I do know. But we should also not be afraid to admit that we don’t know everything. This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 9 November 2018. Although the 2019 European elections are still over half a year away, we have seen a flurry of activity across Europe and regular media coverage of these activities. This ranges from the potential new alignment of parties in European Parliament, to the floating of names for top EU positions.
Brexit plays a role in this in two ways. First, 73 British members will soon be leaving the European Parliament. There already has been a decision on what to do with these vacant seats. More interesting is what this will mean for different party groups. The European Conservatives and Reformists, in particular, will lose a large chunk of its membership. But other groups will see quite a few members leaving too. Second, Brexit has given Eurosceptics across Europe the feeling that the tide is on their side – even though their results in recent national elections have been mixed (to say the least). This feeling of euphoria is not limited to the likes of Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. Viktor Orbán has gradually become even more vocal in terms of his criticism on ‘Brussels’, as is the case for parties such as the 5 Start Movement in Italy. What could this mean in light of the 2019 European elections? The European elections have long been characterised by a strange paradox: while its powers have gradually increased with the aim of strengthening its democratic standing, voter turnout has been going down since the first direct elections in 1979. In 2014 the European Parliament coined the phrase “this time it’s different”, implying that there really was something at stake in the elections (think Spitzenkandidaten, Euro crisis, etc.), but to no avail. Yet, the 2019 elections may really become quite different. Not because of the Spitzenkandidaten (who knows Martin Weber or even Alexander Stubb, really?), but rather because of the realignment of political groups. There has been movement on several fronts. Italy’s 5 Star Movement is expected to launch a new pro-European, anti-establishment group after Christmas. Also, European movement Volt is aiming to disrupt traditional politics with a very pro-European message. Despite such developments, at the moment we see two main camps emerging: a progressive, pro-European movement and conservative, Eurosceptic movement. This actually may increase the chances of these elections actually tying in with what’s really on voters’ minds. Namely, are you for or against the EU and further integration? While this, arguably, is not what these elections should be about (why not discuss different policy options, as the main groups have always argued for?), this is how they have been framed in mediated public debates. On the one hand, although still within the christian democratic group himself,Victor Orbán’s flirt with ‘illiberal democracy’ may be attractive to other parties, in particular those who are part of the European Conservatives and Reformists group and are in danger of losing their ‘home’ (and, hence, funding, speaking time, and other resources). The Polish Law and Justice Party could be tempted into joining forces with Orbán, but perhaps even some of the other Eurosceptic parties in parliament may be willing to join. Together they may form a force for less integration and more sovereignty for the member states. One the other hand, French president Emmanuel Macron is making steps towards setting up a progressive, pro-European movement. This may be an attractive option for the Liberals – see Verhofstadt’s wheeling and dealing – but also for Green parties across Europe – with Daniel Cohn-Bendit already a prominent campaigner in Macron’s camp. It is within these two groups that, today, we find some of the more pro-European politicians, not in the social democratic and christian democratic groups. In fact, during several recent national elections the Greens have emerged as a progressive alternative to populist parties. In other words, the 2019 European elections may finally get to see the polarised debate between pro-European and Eurosceptic politicians that is normally mostly only framed as such in the mediated public debate. And while this may not be the politicisation that some would like to see, it may be exactly this debate that is needed in times of Brexit, Italian budget rows, and Trump’s seeming willingness to break down the international order. The time for muddling through seems to have come to an end and a democratic vote is the right way to decide what to do next. Are we going to combat these challenges together? Or do we want national governments to do the work on their own, in ‘splendid isolation’? Co-authored with Afke Groen. This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 15 March 2017 (in English) and the websites of the EU-Asia Institute of the ESSCA School of Management and Alliance Europa on 11 March (both in French). Last year many commentators were blown away by the British vote to leave the European Union (EU) and the election of President Donald Trump in the United States. The Irish commentator and economist David McWilliams called 2016 “the year of the outsider”. Predictions are that 2017 will not be different, with important elections taking place all over Europe. Many see the Dutch elections as “the first big test” of what’s to come. The country’s leading populist politician, Geert Wilders, has already proclaimed a “patriotic spring” that may increase the pressures on an already besieged EU. We previously wrote about how Dutch politics works, and about the rise and chances of Geert Wilders in the 2017 national elections. In this blog post, we question the idea that the Dutch elections mark the start of a “patriotic spring” – that is, the idea that “the people” will regain control from “the elite” at the national and European level.
So far “Europe” hardly plays a role in the Dutch election campaign. Even Wilders seems to steer away from the issue. As Stijn van Kessel of Loughborough University elaborates, data shows that the Dutch do not want a ‘Nexit’. Moreover, other issues are prevailing in the campaign. The most dominant overarching theme is the Dutch economy, and in particular the question of what policy to pursue in times of a budget surplus and low unemployment. The economy is typically a theme that Dutch politicians like to link to the EU (“lots of red-tape”, “we are net-payers”, and “no more money to Greece”). But in this campaign, politicians have rather linked it to the question of what is important to Dutch society: should extra money mostly go to creating more jobs, reforming the health care system, investing in climate change policies, improving the educational system, and so on. Another overarching theme is that of what constitutes Dutch identity in the wake of globalization. A “patriotic spring” presupposes debates about national identity threatened by cosmopolitan elites and outside pressures. Yet, in the current election campaign the discussion seems to be rather more nuanced, centering on how to redefine national identity without necessarily rejecting immigration and European integration. For example, leader of the Christian Democrats Sybrand Buma emphasizes national symbols; he brought up the idea of having pupils sing the national anthem at schools. Jesse Klaver, leader of the Greens, rather emphasises an inclusive culture of tolerance and diversity. Moreover, it is quite likely that Wilders will be sidelined after 15 March. First, most parties have stated that they do not want to cooperate with him. Second, one week before the elections the latest polls also suggest that he will not gain the high number of votes that was predicted just a few weeks ago. This does not mean that Wilders’ ideas are being ignored. As has often happened in Dutch political history, mainstream parties had already adopted some of his populist and even nationalist discourse on issues such as immigration and European integration. For instance, while at face value his ideas seem to be less prominent, the fact that identity is a key issue during the current campaign can be attributed to him. Interestingly, in the wake of the alleged “patriotic spring”, a counter movement even seems to be emerging. The “rise of the populist right” is often seen as a linear process, starting with Brexit and Trump, and continuing throughout elections on the European continent. But pitted against the populist right-wing ideas of Wilders are a set of beliefs that stress diversity and openness towards outside influences. This is most visibly illustrated by the increasing support for parties such as the social-liberal D66 and the Greens. There seems to be a similar trend in France and Germany, where, respectively, pro-European Emmanuel Macron and former European Parliament President Martin Schulz are making unexpected gains in the polls. They too emphasise ideas of openness and tolerance and the need to cooperate at the European level. All in all, it could just as well be that the Dutch elections will not lead to the start of a “patriotic spring” of the European populist far right, but signal a rebalancing of European politics. This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 15 January 2017. Co-authored with Russell Foster (King's College London). 2016 was an eventful year for Europeans. A Dutch rejection of European Union extension, the Union’s uneasy refugee deal with Turkey, the shock of Brexit, the selection of an American president-elect whose (lack of) economic vision casts shadows over transatlantic commerce, and finally a referendum in Italy which, like its earlier counterpart in the Netherlands, seems to suggest growing popular resistance to the European project. 2016 is already being recorded as the year in which deep dissatisfactions and structural weaknesses in the EU, some traceable to the Credit Crunch of 2008 and some to the foundations of the post-war project in the 1950s, finally reached critical mass. Expansion has halted. The Eurozone is fracturing faster than the cracks can be repaired. And the second-most powerful economy in the Union has opted to withdraw into internal factionalism, inspiring movements across the continent as angry and disillusioned voters tired of the distant plutocrats of the status quo throw in their lot with anti-establishment, unashamedly anti-European parties that defy categorisation according to an obsolete left/right spectrum. Yet these events were merely an opening skirmish. The Battle for Europe has barely begun.
Welcome to 2017. A year which, as a spate of media attention suggests, will be recorded as an epochal year in European history. A year that might be used by future historians to mark the end of the long twentieth century; a year over which people might retrospectively lament the end of the post-war project. Perhaps 2017 will not be quite so bleak, and future scholars may see this year as the beginning of the European Union’s renaissance rather than its apocalypse. But one thing is for certain – 2017 is the year in which the fate of the European Union will be decided. Elections are scheduled in countries whose commitment to, and involvement in, Europe are far more significant than the withdrawal of an archipelago nation whose support for the Union has always oscillated between lukewarm and grudging. In the EU’s core states of France, Germany and the Netherlands, Marine Le Pen’s Front National, Frauke Petry’s Alternative für Deutschland, and Geert Wilder’s Partij voor de Vrijheid might propel into power charismatic isolationists who will make Nigel Farage and Norbert Hoffer appear amateurish. Three elections that have the potential to change Europe as we know it. Both Le Pen and Wilders have already confirmed that, if they win, they will organise referendums on Frexit and Nexit (admit it; ‘Brexit’ at least sounds better). Petry has not dismissed European integration as such, but does want a referendum on the Eurozone. While this might appear harmless in comparison, it raises the serious question of whether the European Union can continue to exist without the Eurozone, or whether the two are now so entwined that the dismemberment of the common currency area will drag the entire European project with it. Predictions at present are unclear, but 2016 was a year of wrong predictions. “Brexit? After the fury of the Scottish schism, surely the English will come to their senses.” “Trump? That incompetent charlatan? Of course not!” Yet here we are. If there is one thing to learn from last year, it is that we are out-of-step with our own populations. It must be conceded that none of this may happen. In early December 2016, pundits expected that Austria would end up under an admittedly ceremonial, but powerfully symbolic right-wing populist, the first since the defeat of the New Order in 1945. Instead, the new president is to be a liberal politician and former member of the Greens. Perhaps there is hope, and perhaps further hope for popular support for the EU will come from an unlikely source – Brexit. In the summer of 2016 Europeans feared a surge in anti-Europe sentiment across the continent. This has admittedly happened. But as the shock of Brexit – whether horror or elation – dulls into banality and tedium, it is increasingly clear that Brexit is going to be an ugly, messy, mutually spiteful process. And in a dark irony, this might be the salvation of Europe. None of this may happen. In late November last year the European Parliament’s chief negotiator, liberal MEP Guy Verhofstadt, reportedly welcomed Brexit secretary Davis Davis ‘to hell’. Perhaps his words were more prescient than even he imagined, as one of the EU’s first casualties of 2017 was Great Britain’s representative to the Union, Sir Ivan Rogers. The man charged with negotiating as painless a divorce as possible left with what may transpire to be an ominous warning on “muddled thinking”. Closely following this came a statement by the British Prime Minister which seems to indicate a more bitter separation than originally imagined. Regardless of when Mrs May triggers Article 50 (“when”, not “whether”, as the latter would be at the risk of national rioting and the overnight evaporation of public faith in British democracy), neither Britain nor Europe is prepared for an exit within two years. Current indications suggest that negotiating Britain’s exit could take a decade. Assuming that there is still a European Union to leave in the mid to late 2020s, the painful, dragged-out negotiations of Brexit and the continued possibility that the first country to leave the EU will suffer severe economic decline, EU policymakers and anti-EU politicians in Europe may look to Britain and realise, respectively, that the Union needs urgent and substantial reform and that withdrawal has long-term national disadvantages which outweigh the short-term party advantages of winning a few years in office. But in 2017, Brexit is no longer the dominant issue. While the British – whether Leave or Remain – might imagine that they are the EU’s main talking point, it is clear that in the minds of EU policymakers and administrators, the British and their internal squabbles are a sideshow. Another financial crisis, in a crumbling Eurozone which cannot be propped up forever, is not only inevitable but imminent. The shaky deal between a Union scrambling to shore up its borders and a Turkish Republic rapidly sliding towards authoritarianism appears increasingly untenable. If Recip Erdogan reneges on the deal Europe will likely experience a second Migration Crisis which, in a year of border fortifications and mutual mistrust between populations and politicians, will make 2014 pale in comparison. And while there is hope of a significant thawing in relations between the White House and the Kremlin in the wake of Mr Trump’s inauguration, a geopolitical vacuum following the imminent defeat of Islamic State and the continuing weakness of the Russian Federation’s economy present new urgencies and opportunities for Mr Putin to cling onto power through further foreign meddling. The recent arrival into Eastern Europe of large contingents of American armour indicates that Europe may face a new standoff against Russia. These are gloomy predictions, but 2016 was a gloomy year. Is there sufficient reason to believe that 2017 will be different? All in all, much to think and write about. We aim to provide you with our own reflections, but we will strongly welcome guest contributions from others. If you are interested in writing a piece for this blog, don’t hesitate to write to us! We are interested in all aspects of Brexit, from its significance in Scotland and its fallout in EU nations, to its portrayal in media and its impact on those academic libraries on which many readers of this blog so urgently depend. 2017 will be a testing year for Europe, so make your voice heard! More details on how to submit ideas or posts are available here. Wishing you all the best for 2017! This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 14 December 2016 The stream of news related to the forthcoming British withdrawal from the EU isn’t likely to dry up anytime soon. Being a scholar who is interested in media and Euroscepticism, one piece of news caught my attention. On 29 November, several British media – for instance, The Independent – reported that News Group Newspapers, the company that owns The Sun and The Times, had had to register as a campaign group, following a Brexit poster campaign initiated by The Sun. More than 96,000 pounds was spent on a ‘BeLEAVE in Britain’ poster (Interesting detail: The Times favoured Bremain).
The anti-European stance of parts of the British press is, of course, rather well documented. For instance, in an article published in 2012 Oliver Daddow wrote that the rhetoric of the British press emphasises ‘destructive dissent’ based on perceived ‘threats to British sovereignty and identity’ originating from a German-run continent. And last year Nick Startin explained how the tabloid press in particular have played a key role in the radicalisation of the British EU debate, having had a clear impact on the framing of (debates about) the EU. In fact, a recent study by Press Gazette found that a clear majority of the readers of four of the national newspapers that most vocally favoured a Brexit – the Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph and The Sun – voted for Britain to leave the EU. Stereotypes commonly occur in the British press and are an important source for misinterpretation of European politics. Such unbalanced reporting goes at the expense of people’s opportunities to inform themselves about the EU. While this certainly also occurs in other EU states, the British media system differs in that newspapers in particular tend to be much more vocal and politically outspoken than in many other European countries. Nonetheless, it is common practice to proclaim that ‘the media’ across Europe are negative about politics and Eurosceptic in their outlook towards the EU. Yet, there are two problems here: the illusiveness of Euroscepticism and the relatively small body of research on media and Euroscepticism. The first problem concerns the rather abstract notion of ‘Euroscepticism’, which tends to be used in different contexts, often without clarifying what it actually entails. In her book Understanding Euroscepticism, Cécile Leconte calls Euroscepticism a ‘plastic notion’. Similarly, Simon Usherwood refers to it as a ‘reductive term’. In yet to be published research, I found that there is a much broader variety of criticism towards the EU as covered by the media, than tends to be assumed. For instance, when policies are criticised for the choices made (e.g. austerity vs. investment), but without denying the need for EU involvement. Yet, at the same time media reporting of EU affairs often reduces – to borrow from Usherwood – it to an anti-European stance, disregarding the broader spectrum of perspectives. This then brings me to the second problem: the existing body of literature on Euroscepticism mostly focusses on political parties and public opinion and has only recently broadened its scope. New research reveals that critical debates about the EU often have a transnational dimension. In addition, new media research shows that the multi-faced nature of Euroscepticism is also increasingly reflected in different types of media. For instance, Charlotte Galpin, Ben Leruth and I are currently in the process of writing up a paper in which we’ve looked into how Brexit was covered by centre-right newspapers in France, Germany and the Netherlands. What emerges, is a increasingly shared discourse in which initial understanding for British calls for reforms gradually is replaced by a debate framed in terms of ‘us’ (EU27) versus ‘them’ (Britain). Based on these two points, I believe that we should be careful when referring to ‘the media’ in the context of debates about Brexit and Euroscepticism. Media systems across Europe are different, as is the degree of criticism towards the EU. While I agree with my fellow curator Russell Foster that Brexit “must be understood as merely one symptom of a much broader problem”, this should not mean that we equate Euroscepticism with anti-Europeanism. Instead, we should actually make sure to aim for a more encompassing understanding of the variety of critical and oppositional opinions towards the EU and its policies. This is not to say that there is no ground to criticise the EU – far from it! The democratic nature of EU decision-making and the resulting policy choices could be (and should be) critically discussed. Yet, as I wrote in my previous post, support for the EU went up post-Brexit. In fact, in the recent rerun of the Austrian presidential elections, newly elected President Alexander van der Bellen campaigned on a pro-European ticket and, against all odds, beat Eurosceptic candidate Norbert Hofer with a bigger margin than earlier this year. This alone may not be enough to save the EU, but it certainly emphasises the need – as argued by Cas Mudde – to put things in ‘proper perspective’ and steer away from a (self-fulfilling?) story in which ‘the people’ or ‘the media’ are against the EU. This post was originally published by CERiM on 8 December 2016 Brexit, the Eurozone and refugee crises, and increased criticism on globalisation have shed doubts about the future of European integration. This certainly isn’t the first time that the European Union (EU) is going through a crisis, nor is it the first time that European integration is questioned. But, this mood seems to be more acute than ever before. This also presents challenges for teaching European Studies.
The rationale for studying European Studies The livelihood of any programme in higher education depends on its ability to attract new students. Yet, recently current and prospective students have been asking questions about the need to continue studying Europe. For instance, during Politico’s Harry Cooper’s recent Jean Monnet Lecture on 13 October 2016, an audience member asked whether he had made a good choice by opting for our BA in European Studies. I don’t think that a total collapse of the EU is very likely. The EU – including all its pros and cons – has become an integral part of political and even public life in Europe. Criticism of the EU tends to be equated to being anti-EU, yet often doesn’t concern its existence as such, but rather what it does (and doesn’t!) do. Several post-Brexit polls have actually shown that support for the EU has increased since. European Studies transcends disciplinary boundaries, helping us to better understand contemporary developments such as Brexit. It does so in an international context, with the majority of students and staff being non-Dutch, thus allowing for different national perspectives to be brought in. Perhaps even more importantly, students acquire knowledge and skills that allow them to continue studying in a variety of fields – in fact, many do and most of our alumni actually don’t end up working in Brussels. Keeping European Studies up-to-date The fact that there are more generic reasons why studying European Studies still makes sense, doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t adapt our programmes to take into account the ever-changing context in which we teach. Having been programme director myself, I know that keeping programmes up-to-date is time consuming and challenging, having to take into account final qualifications, teaching and exam regulation, etc. But, there are other ways in which we can address the contemporary issues that students want to learn about and discuss. First, Maastricht University prides itself on its use of Problem-Based Learning (PBL). In its purest sense, PBL assumes that we don’t provide students with reading lists, but that they search for literature themselves, based on gaps in their knowledge. Even when literature is given, PBL allows for critical discussions that extend beyond that literature. So, when applied properly, PBL offers many opportunities to bring in contemporary developments. A second way in which we can address the need to adapt to contemporary developments, is by stressing extra-curricular events that can help to establish a link between what we teach and the everyday reality of Europe. Within Maastricht, this includes the events organised by CERiM, which have focussed on all kinds of contemporary issues, but also lectures and debates organised by Studium Generale or the city and province. What’s next? European Studies student Kerstin Spath recently wrote in the university newspaper Observant that “the EU offers us so much. So why can’t it just stay like that?” The EU will, of course, change post-Brexit (as international students in the UK are already experiencing), but it is also likely to stay. And if it doesn’t we could always consider changing to European Disintegration Studies, in which we will address the question “what on earth went wrong with the EU?”! This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 16 November 2016 This is the first full post for E-International Relations’ blog section ‘Brexit: A European Perspective’. And although we did not plan it that way, it could not have come at a better time, because on 3 November dictionary publisher Collins announced that ‘Brexit’ is named Word of the Year 2016.
Defined as ‘the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union’, I think we can all agree – whether for or against the EU – that the outcome of the referendum held on 23rd June 2016 will have a profound effect on the future of Europe and of the UK. But with Donald Trump’s victory in the US just a few days ago, we may also ask whether ‘Brexit’ is the rightful winner. In fact, when you scroll down the list published by Collins, you’ll find that ‘Trumpism’ was another contender. Even Nigel Farage called Trump’s win ‘bigger than Brexit’! In any case, after the UK’s vote to leave the EU and the Americans’ choice for ‘The Donald’ to become the 45th President of the United States of America, I assume that ‘the people’ stand a good chance of being named Time‘s Person of the Year. They would then succeed Angela Merkel, who won last year ‘for providing steadfast moral leadership in a world where it is in short supply’ and who, incidentally, was called ‘insane’ by Trump. Oh, the irony… While many Europeans may have been quite shocked by Trump’s victory, Eurosceptics across Europe seem to perceive it as a boost for their own politics. Front National’s Marine Le Pen was among the first to congratulate Trump with his win, while Frauke Petry, leader of the Alternatieve für Deutschland (AfD; Alternative for Germany), tweeted that the Americans had opted for a new start. Dutch populist Geert Wilderscalled Trump’s victory an historic one and declared that he and his Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV; Party for Freedom) would, too, ‘give our country back to the Dutch!’. Politico has been publishing very actively on the issue. Nicholas Vinocur wrote that Europe’s populists are talking about a new world order, ‘one in which national sovereignty beats international agreements, in which immigration is kept to a minimum, and in which alliances that have existed for decades no longer hold sway.’ And Harry Cooper has done some nice work for those interested in European politics, presenting ‘a calendar of possible populist victories’ in Europe’s near future. For my part, I am not just randomly mentioning Le Pen, Petry and Wilders. Le Pen will be aiming for the French presidency in April and May of next year, the AfD hopes to win its first ever seats in the Bundestag, and Wilders’ PVV is hoping to become the biggest Dutch party in the March 2017 general elections. Successful results for these Eurosceptic parties in all three founding members of the EU is quite likely. While one could imagine that Merkel will still be in charge a year from now, Hollande definitely seems to be a lost cause. Even when Le Pen does not win, there’s still former President Nicolas Sarkozy, who’s become more critical about the EU than before. Meanwhile, for what it’s worth, polls suggest that Wilders might come in second in the Dutch elections – after having been in the lead until not so long ago. In fact, there are some who think that ‘Brexit’ and ‘Trumpism’ may actually increase support for the EU, such as Mario Monti, who discussed further European defence cooperation on BBC Radio 4 the day after the American elections. This then takes me back to the start of this blog post, to ‘Brexit’ and ‘Trumpism’ and to the question what will become the Word of the Year 2017? ‘Frexit’, ‘Nexit’ or maybe back to ‘ever closer union’? I wish I knew. I have become a bit hesitant to make predictions since I was a panellist in a debate on Brexit just before 23 June and argued how I thought Brexit was not going to happen… (Neither did I really expect Trump to win – even though I was less convinced.) In any case, there is no doubt that next year’s going to be another interesting one as far as European politics is concerned. Is it possible that, despite increased support for the EU in quite a few Member States after Brexit, other Europeans will be susceptible for a similar path? No doubt an issue that we will further look into in this blog section. To be continued! This post was originally published by De Hofvijver on 29 February 2016 Ze zijn eruit. David Cameron en zijn collega’s zijn erin geslaagd overeenstemming te bereiken over de plaats van Groot-Brittannië in de Europese Unie (EU). Niet-Euro landen krijgen de mogelijkheid om aan de rem te trekken wanneer de eurolanden besluiten willen nemen waar ze het niet me eens zijn, er zijn afspraken gemaakt over beperkingen van sociale voorzieningen voor inkomende EU-burgers en er komt er in het verdrag te staan dat de Britten niet mee doen aan een ‘ever closer union’. Niet helemaal wat Cameron oorspronkelijk eiste, maar voldoende voor hem om vast te houden aan het Britse EU-lidmaatschap.
De andere lidstaten lijken ook niet geheel ontevreden. Er lijkt voldoende ruimte voor interpretatie van de overeenkomst om iedereen te laten profiteren (voor de fijnproevers: de overeenkomst is ongeveer 20 pagina’s lang). Door het vastleggen van delen van de overeenkomst uit te stellen tot de volgende verdragswijziging is er ook ruimte gecreëerd om nog zaken uit te ruilen. Maar nu wordt het pas echt spannend. Op 23 juni mogen de Britten naar de stembus om te bepalen of ze lid van de EU willen blijven. Voor Cameron mag de deal dan voldoende zijn om vóór EU-lidmaatschap te stemmen, maar dat geldt niet voor alle Tories. Meerdere kabinetsleden hebben al aangegeven voor een ‘Brexit’ te zijn, zoals voormalig partijleider Iain Duncan Smith. Hetzelfde geldt voor de populaire burgemeester van London, Boris Johnson. Een eiland is anders In tegenstelling tot wat soms wordt beweerd is dit niet het eerste in/uit referendum. In 1982 besloot Groenland na een referendum de club te verlaten. En, nog belangrijker, in 1975 hebben de Britten al gestemd over het lidmaatschap van de Europese Gemeenschappen – ook na heronderhandeling met de andere lidstaten. Er was uiteindelijk ruime steun voor lidmaatschap. De peilingen suggereren dat het nu beide kanten op kan gaan. Het kan niet ontkend worden dat de Britten, op zijn zachtst gezegd, kritisch zijn over de EU. Daarbij komt dat er een breed gedragen gevoel is dat het eiland anders is dan ‘the continent’ en dat, in de woorden van Menno Spiering in zijn boek A Cultural History of British Euroscepticism (Palgrave, 2015, p. 34), “over the years Homo Britannicus has branched off from Homo Europaeus.” Maar dit referendum is wezenlijk anders dan andere referenda, zoals over het Europees Grondwettelijk Verdrag in Nederland in 2005 of over een Noors EU-lidmaatschap in 1994. Een ‘nee’ had in deze gevallen feitelijk geen directe consequentie, want men kon doorgaan op basis van de bestaande situatie, toereikend of niet. Dat is natuurlijk zeker niet het geval voor het referendum over de ‘Brexit’. Stemmen de Britten tegen EU-lidmaatschap, dan liggen ze eruit en dan zullen ze met de EU (én met landen buiten de EU) allerlei nieuwe afspraken moeten gaan maken. De vraag is of de Britse bevolking dat risico wil nemen. Discussie is nog niet voorbij Ongeacht de uitslag, de relatie tussen Groot-Brittannië en de EU zal ook nu niet van de agenda verdwijnen. Velen zien een Brits lidmaatschap als cruciaal voor de EU, zeker ook gezien de onrustige situatie waarin de EU zich nu bevindt. Maar het er zal bij een positieve uitkomst waarschijnlijk maar nipte steun voor lidmaatschap zijn. De tegenstanders – inclusief de Tories die voor een ‘Brexit’ zijn – zullen zich dan opnieuw roeren. Zal Cameron het akkoord dan blijven verdedigen? Het valt dus nog maar te bezien of de EU dan, in de woorden van het hoofdredactioneel commentaar van NRC Handelsblad op 22 februari, “af [is] van een doorzeurende en belastende discussie". Ook wanneer er een meerderheid is voor uittreding, zal de discussie niet voorbij zijn. Zoals Timothy Garton Ash het schreef op de website van The Guardian, daags na het bereiken van het akkoord: "If the English vote to leave the EU, the Scots will vote to leave the UK. There will then be no Britain.” Schotse onafhankelijkheid (op zichzelf een ontwikkeling met een nogal open einde) kan leiden tot nieuw elan bij andere Europese afscheidingsbewegingen en nog meer onrust. Bij een afwijzing van EU-lidmaatschap blijft echter ook nog steeds de vraag welke relatie dan wél gewenst is, inclusief de vraag of een EU-lidmaatschap helemaal van de baan is. Zo gaf Boris Johnson tijdens zijn persconferentie van 21 februari meerdere keren aan dat hij best lid wil zijn van een ‘betere’ EU: “I will be advocating a leave (…) because I want a better deal for the people of this country”. Kortom, to be continued… |
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