Originally published by the DCU Brexit Blog on 19 January 2022. After a record 271 days of negotiations a new Dutch coalition government took office on Monday 10 January. Although, is it really new? The same four parties that formed the previous government – Christian-Democratic CDA, Christian CU, Social-Liberal D66 and Conservative-Liberal VVD – are also in the new government. Yet, it does come with many new faces and plans. This includes what is at first sight a rather different approach towards the EU.
In the recent past the Netherlands has become known as a reluctant EU member, particularly following ‘Black Monday’ in 1991, when an ambitious Dutch blueprint for a federal Europe was rejected, and the Dutch ‘No’ to the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, partly due to increased dissatisfaction with the pace and extent of European integration. Whether the Dutch ever were passionate believers in European integration before that time, may be questioned. But the country having become known as a member of the ‘New Hanseatic League’ and one of the ‘Frugal Four’ (for an insightful study, see here), it seemed almost like it had become a UK lite, stepping into the gap that occurred after Brexit to become perhaps the most Eurosceptic member of the EU. It therefore may come as a surprise that the new coalition agreement reads that “The Netherlands will play a leading role in making the EU more effective, economically stronger, greener and more secure.” But there’s more.
Of course, the proof is in the pudding; these are words on paper and reality may be quite different. But, as Rem Korteweg of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael also noted in a recent Twitter thread, some of the wording of the Dutch coalition agreement is quite similar to that of the new German government. Unlike the German government, the Dutch are not calling for a federal EU. But with the French and the Germans now seeing eye-to-eye on a number of EU reforms, the similarity between the two coalition agreements suggests that the new Dutch government may have become a Germany lite that will no longer put a break on the further development of the EU.
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This blog was originally published by the DCU Brexit Institute on 24 June 2021. If there is one thing that has become clear during the long years of Brexit negotiations between the EU and the UK, it is that the EU27 – despite their differences – were able to act in a united way when it came to negotiating with a soon-to-be third country. Highlighting the perks of membership has played a role in this. In her 2019 JCMS Annual Review lecture, Brigid Laffan also argued that one of the EU’s strategic goals in this process was “to affirm the Union’s dominance in governing transnational relations in Europe.”
Yet, the two sides continue to haggle about their divorce. While the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement came into force on 1 May 2021, the ongoing discussions about the status of Northern Ireland show that Brexit by no means is a done deal. The divorce came with an agreement to maintain an open border between Ireland and Northern Ireland to uphold the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Yet, the UK already wants to alter this Protocol as it comes with checks on British goods entering Northern Ireland, effectively creating a border within the UK. In the context of the recent G7 summit, UK Brexit negotiator David Frost even attended a meeting wearing Union Jack socks in a not-so-subtle message for the EU. Whereas the Europeans continue to take a tough negotiating stance affirming their trust in rule-based international relations, the British approach to Northern Ireland might tempt others into trying to get out of existing agreements. If it is so (relatively) easy to undermine an agreement with the EU, wouldn’t other non-EU European countries be willing to do so too? Two recent developments are worth discussing in this context. First, in late May Switzerland pulled out of negotiations on a detailed partnership agreement with the EU. EU-Swiss relationships have never been straightforward, as illustrated by a range of referendums that had a (potential) impact on dealings between the two. For instance, only in September last year the Swiss rejected a proposal on ending the free movement agreement with the EU in a referendum that “echoed the Brexit vote”, according to The Guardian. The partnership agreements, negotiations on which have been going in since 2014, were partly an attempt to reduce uncertainty by means of an encompassing agreement that would replace the many existing bilateral agreements. Like in the case of Brexit, here too the debate revolves around the Swiss wanting exemptions from rules that the EU wants to uphold. Foreign Policy columnist Caroline de Gruyter has even called Switzerland the “next big problem” for the EU. A second example relates to reports that Norwegian opposition parties may want to renegotiate the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement should they get into government. Like Switzerland, Norway may not be an EU member, but it is closely tight to the EU through an intricate web of rules. While the Norwegians voted against EU membership on two occasions in 1972 and 1994, the current situation has been less controversial. While agriculture and fisheries remain divisive issues, relations with the EU overall remain quite well. Indeed, reflecting on potential similarities with Brexit, John Erik Fossum and Joachim Vigrestad argue that it is unlikely that Norwegian politicians would want to jeopardise relations with the EU. In their view, “the sheer size and magnitude of the EU–Norway power asymmetry” is acknowledged and shapes the Norwegian debate. Relations between the EU and Norway might be said to differ from those with Switzerland by being more firmly established through the EEA. Yet, recent debates in both countries show that relations with the EU are not uncontested. Brexit may even have put a new spotlight on these debates. Yet, the question is how committed critics are to really change relations with the EU, especially given the economic benefits they have been enjoying so far. In any case, it is likely that they will encounter an EU that is committed to a united and robust negotiating stance. There is a continued need to reaffirm the value of full membership vis-à-vis ties with the EU as a third country. And while the continuing Brexit saga may heighten hopes in some countries that a new relationship with the EU is possible, it is also likely to reaffirm the EU’s commitment to rule-based relations. This blog was first published by the DCU Brexit Blog on 23 April 2020. A few months back I read Anu Bradford’s much-debated article ‘The Brussels Effect’. Her main argument: through its stringent regulations the EU has set standards for countries across the world, shaping polices on a wide range of issues, from chemicals to privacy. Bradford has elaborated on the argument in a recently published book.
During recent weeks, I had to think about Bradford’s arguments again, mainly because commentators and politicians are once again proclaiming the end of the EU due to internal divisions and its indecisiveness regarding the ongoing Covid-19 crisis. This is not the first time that the EU has been carried to the grave because of a crisis. In fact, as Davis Cross and Ma nicely show in their 2015 article ‘EU crises and integrational panic: The role of the media’, each crisis the EU is confronted with is quickly turned into an existential challenge. The Eurozone crisis? Check The migration crisis? Check Brexit? Check At first sight, the EU does indeed appear to be in troubled waters. It has been unable to coordinate health policy responses and related decisions in light of Covid-19 and member states have been endlessly bickering about economic support measures. Indeed, being Dutch and living just 2.5 KMs from the Belgian border, it is easy to see some truth to this crisis rhetoric. For one, I had never thought that I would see border fences being erected at the end of my street. But also when following EU news, the Dutch position on how the EU should deal with the crisis is not exactly painted as a constructive and supportive one. But let’s look at this new crisis in a bit more detail. And in particular at the economic policy response, because, let’s face it: the member states are primarily responsible for health policy, which may largely explain their unconcerted panic reactions (which does not mean that there are no lessons to be learned here). The economic response rests on the Commission’s policy response as well as on member states’ agreement regarding financial measures. The Commission has been pursuing a policy of more flexibility regarding state aid to allow member states to deal with economic uncertainties. It has also launched the so-called instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE). This instrument is meant to help protect jobs and employees affected by the current crisis by allowing for EU financial assistance to member states through billions of euros of loans from the Commission to member states. The EU finance ministers also recently agreed on a substantial support package, which includes use of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The new multi-annual budget may play a role here as well. Yet, some challenges and questions remain unresolved, with Eurobonds being the most controversial issue (and dating back to the Eurozone crisis). It is also expected that more money will be needed – even up to 1 trillion more, according to Economy Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni. In other words, there has not (yet?) been a ‘Brussels effect’ during the current crisis and there are certainly grounds to criticise the EU’s response to Covid-19 – for a slow reaction, a lack of coordination, and so on. Yet, we should also not forget that these are extraordinary circumstances. Countries across the world have struggled to come up with a good response. And the EU has only seldomly been the first to react to extraordinary circumstances. So, will the current response be sufficient? Probably not. But does that mean that the EU’s end is near? Probably not either. It is more likely that the EU will muddle through this crisis, just like it did at the time of previous crises. Meanwhile, take care of yourselves and your loved ones. #bloggingfromhome This post was originally published by the DCU Brexit Institute Blog on 3 October 2019. It already seems ages ago that we had the kick-off of the European election campaign here in Maastricht on 29 April. The Maastricht Debate, as it was called, brought together the Spitzenkandidaten of five of the European party groups. The most prominent absentee was EPP Spitzenkandidat Manfred Weber, who attended a birthday party instead. His absence did lead to speculation as to whether or not this was the real reason for his absence, one of the suggestions put forward being that this may be a sign of the EPP hoping to demote the Spitzenkandidaten system.
Nearly five months later and the Spitzenkandidaten system indeed seems to be more death than alive. French President Macron’s opposition to the system in absence of transnational lists was important, even though Europe’s leaders have never been a fan of the idea. But the new Commission President-elect, Ursula von der Leyen (VDL), at least is a member of the biggest party group, the EPP. Earlier this month VDL presented the proposed team of Commissioners and their portfolios. The European Parliament is now gearing up for its hearings of the European Commission nominees, starting on Monday 30 September. The fact that the number of women in the Commission has gone up so substantially – from 8 to 13 – certainly is great news. But the composition of the new Commission has already led to some debate and commentators are speculating on who will not survive the hearings in Parliament. Questions have also been raised about what will happen to the Commission’s tough stance on the rule of law in Hungary and Poland when Frans Timmermans is no longer in charge. And then there are the lofty and sometimes unclear titles of some of the portfolios, such as ‘An Economy that Works for People’, ‘Democracy and Demography’, ‘International Partnerships’ and, of course, the new post of Commissioner for ‘Protecting our European Way of Life’. These questions and issues are important, and we should applaud the fact that the European Parliament takes its democratic duty seriously and will be critically assessing these questions and issues during its hearings of the Commission candidates. But what seems to be less debated right now, but arguably has become more important than ever, are questions about the future of Europe. In particular, although the expected Eurosceptic surge was more modest than many had anticipated and election turn-out has gone up, questions about Europe’s democratic arrangements remain relevant. If and when the debate about the future of the EU continues, two questions regarding its institutional set-up need to be addressed. The first concerns the role and composition of the European Commission. Is the Commission meant to be a bureaucratic actor, the composition of which should not depend on election outcomes? Or should it become a nascent European government, in which case its composition should depend on those elections? Linked to this is the matter of the size of the Commission, which is not a new question at all, but one that deserves further discussion given that some of the new posts again seem to amount to a rather limited job description. The second question concerns the European elections themselves. Whether or not the Commission is seen as a bureaucratic or a political actor, isn’t it time that transnational election lists finally become reality? While citizens would still be able to elect national politicians, transnational lists might push politicians to move beyond their national focus, which would deepen the transnational European public sphere. What’s more, it might further increase the quality of MEPs, because we could vote for more experienced politicians – former prime ministers even – when our national political parties choose to nominate less experienced or frankly outlandish candidates. However important, right now it doesn’t seem that these issues will be addressed in the short run. If only because some fear that they will open a box of pandora when it comes to EU reform. But there also still is this one issue that hasn’t been resolved yet (and that I’ve managed to avoid so far): Brexit. Until Brexit happens – or is off the table completely? – the debate about the EU’s future will remain low-key. But Europe will have to move on, with or without our British friends. This post was originally published by the DCU Brexit Institute Blog on 21 May 2019. At the time of writing, we are nearing the third anniversary of the Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016. While a cause for celebration or a grave feeling of loss, depending on where you stand on the issue, it almost feels like nothing much has happened since. In fact, while Brexit originally was to happen on 29 March of this year, British politicians have been unable to reach agreement on what that Brexit should look like. As a result, Brexit has been postponed, most recently until the end of October 2019.
After many ‘meaningful’ votes (oh, the irony…) we are now in a situation in which British citizens are asked to vote during the upcoming European Parliament (EP) elections of 23-26 May 2019, something that both the British government and the European Union (EU) wanted to avoid. What might this development hold for the EP elections? The composition of the EP The most visible and at the same time most confusing result of the EP elections taking place pre-Brexit concerns the future composition of the parliament. The inaugural plenary session of the newly elected parliament is scheduled for 2 July 2019, nearly four months before the new Brexit date. But already in June group composition will be discussed. Parliament’s main business will first concern the composition of the new European Commission. As Simon Usherwood explained elsewhere on the DCU Brexit Blog, 73 of the newly elected 751 Members of European Parliament (MEPs) will be representing the British people. This has a direct effect on the composition of some groups. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group was about to lose a large share of its membership – the MEPs from the Conservative Party – but will certainly have newly elected MEPs in their midst that will leave again when Brexit becomes reality. The same applies to the Party of European Socialists, of which Labour is currently a member of. The PES might benefit from this vis-à-vis the European People’s Party in the context of the Spitzenkandidaten contest, even though polls suggest that the EPP will remain the biggest party. When (if?) Brexit becomes reality, the newly elected British MEPs will leave again. The number of MEPs will then decrease to 705. Of the 73 British seats, 46 will be reserved for future enlargements and 27 will be redistributed to other countries. Does this mean that MEPs for these seats will already be elected, but can only take up their seat after Brexit? This is an issue that may be more complicated than anticipated. Euroscepticism and parliamentary politics post-Brexit Whether Eurosceptic parties in other countries are to benefit from this situation is difficult to predict. On the one hand, they could use the current situation as an example of how the EU prohibits nation-states from going their own way – against the outcome of a popular vote. Yet, on the other hand, we have seen that support for EU membership has gone up since Brexit and the current situation may simply highlight the chaos that awaits one when wanting to leave the EU. In any case, these are going to be interesting elections. As I already wrote elsewhere, we are seeing a political landscape evolve that better represents the topic that many citizens associate European elections with: are you for or against the EU? Whether we like it or not, with Macron pushing for a pro-European alliance and Salvini (soon to be joined by Orbán?) representing the Eurosceptic vote, we might see a campaign that also highlights this issue instead of the different policy choices to be made. And while the pro-European parties will remain the dominant force, Eurosceptic parties are projected to win more seats than ever before. While their representation in the EP may be a good thing for EU democracy, whether or not an increased number of Eurosceptic MEPs will change EU politics and the functioning of EP is another story. As Nathalie Brack shows in her recent book, informal and formal rules limit the political opportunities for Eurosceptic MEPs. In addition, the way in which these MEPs engage with EP business ranges from near-complete absence to full engagement. This is partly to be explained by the diversity between Eurosceptic parties, with some being against any form of European integration, whereas other rather campaign for a different Europe. What’s next? If only we knew. The Brexit saga has been one of many expected and unexpected plot twists. During the campaign for the 2024 European elections, we may look back at this whole affair as an interesting experiment, after Brexit was rejected in another referendum in 2020. Or we may see an election campaign that is concerned with the politics of an EU that has moved on after Britain finally left on 31 October 2019. Or perhaps just a few months later. This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 9 November 2018. Although the 2019 European elections are still over half a year away, we have seen a flurry of activity across Europe and regular media coverage of these activities. This ranges from the potential new alignment of parties in European Parliament, to the floating of names for top EU positions.
Brexit plays a role in this in two ways. First, 73 British members will soon be leaving the European Parliament. There already has been a decision on what to do with these vacant seats. More interesting is what this will mean for different party groups. The European Conservatives and Reformists, in particular, will lose a large chunk of its membership. But other groups will see quite a few members leaving too. Second, Brexit has given Eurosceptics across Europe the feeling that the tide is on their side – even though their results in recent national elections have been mixed (to say the least). This feeling of euphoria is not limited to the likes of Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. Viktor Orbán has gradually become even more vocal in terms of his criticism on ‘Brussels’, as is the case for parties such as the 5 Start Movement in Italy. What could this mean in light of the 2019 European elections? The European elections have long been characterised by a strange paradox: while its powers have gradually increased with the aim of strengthening its democratic standing, voter turnout has been going down since the first direct elections in 1979. In 2014 the European Parliament coined the phrase “this time it’s different”, implying that there really was something at stake in the elections (think Spitzenkandidaten, Euro crisis, etc.), but to no avail. Yet, the 2019 elections may really become quite different. Not because of the Spitzenkandidaten (who knows Martin Weber or even Alexander Stubb, really?), but rather because of the realignment of political groups. There has been movement on several fronts. Italy’s 5 Star Movement is expected to launch a new pro-European, anti-establishment group after Christmas. Also, European movement Volt is aiming to disrupt traditional politics with a very pro-European message. Despite such developments, at the moment we see two main camps emerging: a progressive, pro-European movement and conservative, Eurosceptic movement. This actually may increase the chances of these elections actually tying in with what’s really on voters’ minds. Namely, are you for or against the EU and further integration? While this, arguably, is not what these elections should be about (why not discuss different policy options, as the main groups have always argued for?), this is how they have been framed in mediated public debates. On the one hand, although still within the christian democratic group himself,Victor Orbán’s flirt with ‘illiberal democracy’ may be attractive to other parties, in particular those who are part of the European Conservatives and Reformists group and are in danger of losing their ‘home’ (and, hence, funding, speaking time, and other resources). The Polish Law and Justice Party could be tempted into joining forces with Orbán, but perhaps even some of the other Eurosceptic parties in parliament may be willing to join. Together they may form a force for less integration and more sovereignty for the member states. One the other hand, French president Emmanuel Macron is making steps towards setting up a progressive, pro-European movement. This may be an attractive option for the Liberals – see Verhofstadt’s wheeling and dealing – but also for Green parties across Europe – with Daniel Cohn-Bendit already a prominent campaigner in Macron’s camp. It is within these two groups that, today, we find some of the more pro-European politicians, not in the social democratic and christian democratic groups. In fact, during several recent national elections the Greens have emerged as a progressive alternative to populist parties. In other words, the 2019 European elections may finally get to see the polarised debate between pro-European and Eurosceptic politicians that is normally mostly only framed as such in the mediated public debate. And while this may not be the politicisation that some would like to see, it may be exactly this debate that is needed in times of Brexit, Italian budget rows, and Trump’s seeming willingness to break down the international order. The time for muddling through seems to have come to an end and a democratic vote is the right way to decide what to do next. Are we going to combat these challenges together? Or do we want national governments to do the work on their own, in ‘splendid isolation’? This post was originally published by E-International Relations and Law Blogs Maastricht on 20 April 2018. Co-authored with Mark T. Kawakami of the university's Law Faculty. While the EU proudly proclaims its motto to be “United in Diversity”, it is difficult to ignore the reality that various attempts at European harmonization have also engendered animosities and frustration between the EU Member States. Brexit is the most obvious manifestation of this tension. The divorce negotiations between Britain and the EU, which just have entered into their second year, are almost a self-fulfilling prophecy predicted back in the 1970s. While pointing to Brexit may seem too easy of an example to substantiate the statement above, there are some fundamental differences between the Brits and the Continental Europeans that not only have made their relationship increasingly difficult, but may make their divorce even more acrimonious.
From the start of the European integration process, Britain has been, in the words of Stephen George, an “awkward partner”, with warm feelings for European integration only present among pockets of society. Whether Britain is the only “awkward partner”, may be open to debate, but from the moment the European Communities were formed in the 1950s, the British position towards European integration has mostly been lukewarm. Joining the European Communities did not even appear to be an option at first; as their focus was primarily on the Commonwealth and the country’s “special relationship” with the United States. Yet, as the British Empire dwindled and European integration got off to a successful start, the Brits changed their tune and applied for membership in 1961. Due to the French opposition, however, it was not until 1973 that Britain officially joined the Communities. It did not take long before problems arose, as the UK Labour party quickly pledged to renegotiate the membership deal; something that was accepted by the other Member States (sounds familiar, doesn’t it?). On 5 June 1975, the British people overwhelmingly voted in favor of continued membership (with a turnout rate of 64.62%, of which 67.23% voted in favor of continued membership). So, the Anglo-European marriage did not start off well and it certainly wasn’t a marriage based on true love. From the get go, there has been a rather widely shared feeling that the British islands were somehow different from “the continent”. In his book, A Cultural History of British Euroscepticism, Menno Spiering refers to a cultural divide that lies at the heart of the British position towards the EU and argues “that over the years Homo Britannicus has branched off from Homo Europaeus.”The controversial issue of the British relations with “the continent” has cut through society and politics, with both major parties housing fierce opponents and convinced proponents of European integration. Myths and stereotypes came to play an important role in British debates about Europe. From the decision to classify Kilts as women’s wear to the infamous curved bananas, the representation of the European Commission in Britain even offers a “Euromyth A-Z index”! In light of these realities, it should not come as a surprise that the now widely used (and abused) term Euroscepticism originates in Britain. It was first used by the British press during the 1980s to describe Margaret Thatcher’s strained position towards European integration. In fact, according to Nick Startin, the sceptic stance of large parts of the British media towards the EU has played a key role in a process that eventually resulted in the Brexit vote on 23 June 2016. Specifically in the field of law, this difference between the Brits and Continental Europeans visibly manifests itself in the debate over the principle of good faith. In civil law jurisdictions (from the Continental lawyer’s perspective), the principle of good faith requires that the parties to a contract treat one another fairly and reasonably, even in adversarial situations. The doctrine of good faith applies even in pre- and post-contractual situations, when the parties are negotiating over the terms of contract or discussing damages after the contract has been breached. For example, in a sales contract, the principle of good faith attaches various information duties on the seller, who must provide all relevant information to the buyer that could potentially affect the buyer’s decision to purchase the good or not. In the UK (from a common lawyer’s perspective), however, the principle of good faith – for the most part – is something strange and alien, if not something frowned upon. In the words of Lord Ackner in Walford v. Miles (1992), “the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties involved in negotiations.” Rather, most common lawyers adhere to the principle of caveat emptor, or buyer beware, which is to suggest that it is the responsibility of the parties to investigate and figure out for themselves what they are getting themselves into. The other party to the contract is NOT expected to conduct themselves in a reasonable or fair manner. Even the esteemed English commercial lawyer, Roy Goode, spoke very critically against the principle of good faith, stating that “[t]he predictability of the legal outcome of a case is more important than absolute justice” and requiring courts and businesses to consider “vague concepts of fairness” within the context of commercial transactions is something that is undesirable because it would “make judicial decisions unpredictable…” These two legal cultures were happily minding their own business, until the formation of the European Union. In attempting to harmonize the laws of its members, the EU implemented various Directives and Regulations with the aim of merging and marrying two distinct systems of law. The European legislatures’ decision to preserve the principle of good faith in many of the European legal instruments (thus forcing it down the throats of many Brits) was always a source of awkward tension. Now that the UK is ejecting itself from the confines of the EU what interest would they have to keep the principle of good faith within their legislations? And perhaps more interestingly, what incentive – if any – does the British politicians and negotiators have to negotiate their exit in a fair and reasonable manner? Co-authored with Afke Groen. This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 15 March 2017 (in English) and the websites of the EU-Asia Institute of the ESSCA School of Management and Alliance Europa on 11 March (both in French). Last year many commentators were blown away by the British vote to leave the European Union (EU) and the election of President Donald Trump in the United States. The Irish commentator and economist David McWilliams called 2016 “the year of the outsider”. Predictions are that 2017 will not be different, with important elections taking place all over Europe. Many see the Dutch elections as “the first big test” of what’s to come. The country’s leading populist politician, Geert Wilders, has already proclaimed a “patriotic spring” that may increase the pressures on an already besieged EU. We previously wrote about how Dutch politics works, and about the rise and chances of Geert Wilders in the 2017 national elections. In this blog post, we question the idea that the Dutch elections mark the start of a “patriotic spring” – that is, the idea that “the people” will regain control from “the elite” at the national and European level.
So far “Europe” hardly plays a role in the Dutch election campaign. Even Wilders seems to steer away from the issue. As Stijn van Kessel of Loughborough University elaborates, data shows that the Dutch do not want a ‘Nexit’. Moreover, other issues are prevailing in the campaign. The most dominant overarching theme is the Dutch economy, and in particular the question of what policy to pursue in times of a budget surplus and low unemployment. The economy is typically a theme that Dutch politicians like to link to the EU (“lots of red-tape”, “we are net-payers”, and “no more money to Greece”). But in this campaign, politicians have rather linked it to the question of what is important to Dutch society: should extra money mostly go to creating more jobs, reforming the health care system, investing in climate change policies, improving the educational system, and so on. Another overarching theme is that of what constitutes Dutch identity in the wake of globalization. A “patriotic spring” presupposes debates about national identity threatened by cosmopolitan elites and outside pressures. Yet, in the current election campaign the discussion seems to be rather more nuanced, centering on how to redefine national identity without necessarily rejecting immigration and European integration. For example, leader of the Christian Democrats Sybrand Buma emphasizes national symbols; he brought up the idea of having pupils sing the national anthem at schools. Jesse Klaver, leader of the Greens, rather emphasises an inclusive culture of tolerance and diversity. Moreover, it is quite likely that Wilders will be sidelined after 15 March. First, most parties have stated that they do not want to cooperate with him. Second, one week before the elections the latest polls also suggest that he will not gain the high number of votes that was predicted just a few weeks ago. This does not mean that Wilders’ ideas are being ignored. As has often happened in Dutch political history, mainstream parties had already adopted some of his populist and even nationalist discourse on issues such as immigration and European integration. For instance, while at face value his ideas seem to be less prominent, the fact that identity is a key issue during the current campaign can be attributed to him. Interestingly, in the wake of the alleged “patriotic spring”, a counter movement even seems to be emerging. The “rise of the populist right” is often seen as a linear process, starting with Brexit and Trump, and continuing throughout elections on the European continent. But pitted against the populist right-wing ideas of Wilders are a set of beliefs that stress diversity and openness towards outside influences. This is most visibly illustrated by the increasing support for parties such as the social-liberal D66 and the Greens. There seems to be a similar trend in France and Germany, where, respectively, pro-European Emmanuel Macron and former European Parliament President Martin Schulz are making unexpected gains in the polls. They too emphasise ideas of openness and tolerance and the need to cooperate at the European level. All in all, it could just as well be that the Dutch elections will not lead to the start of a “patriotic spring” of the European populist far right, but signal a rebalancing of European politics. This post was originally published by E-International Relations on 15 January 2017. Co-authored with Russell Foster (King's College London). 2016 was an eventful year for Europeans. A Dutch rejection of European Union extension, the Union’s uneasy refugee deal with Turkey, the shock of Brexit, the selection of an American president-elect whose (lack of) economic vision casts shadows over transatlantic commerce, and finally a referendum in Italy which, like its earlier counterpart in the Netherlands, seems to suggest growing popular resistance to the European project. 2016 is already being recorded as the year in which deep dissatisfactions and structural weaknesses in the EU, some traceable to the Credit Crunch of 2008 and some to the foundations of the post-war project in the 1950s, finally reached critical mass. Expansion has halted. The Eurozone is fracturing faster than the cracks can be repaired. And the second-most powerful economy in the Union has opted to withdraw into internal factionalism, inspiring movements across the continent as angry and disillusioned voters tired of the distant plutocrats of the status quo throw in their lot with anti-establishment, unashamedly anti-European parties that defy categorisation according to an obsolete left/right spectrum. Yet these events were merely an opening skirmish. The Battle for Europe has barely begun.
Welcome to 2017. A year which, as a spate of media attention suggests, will be recorded as an epochal year in European history. A year that might be used by future historians to mark the end of the long twentieth century; a year over which people might retrospectively lament the end of the post-war project. Perhaps 2017 will not be quite so bleak, and future scholars may see this year as the beginning of the European Union’s renaissance rather than its apocalypse. But one thing is for certain – 2017 is the year in which the fate of the European Union will be decided. Elections are scheduled in countries whose commitment to, and involvement in, Europe are far more significant than the withdrawal of an archipelago nation whose support for the Union has always oscillated between lukewarm and grudging. In the EU’s core states of France, Germany and the Netherlands, Marine Le Pen’s Front National, Frauke Petry’s Alternative für Deutschland, and Geert Wilder’s Partij voor de Vrijheid might propel into power charismatic isolationists who will make Nigel Farage and Norbert Hoffer appear amateurish. Three elections that have the potential to change Europe as we know it. Both Le Pen and Wilders have already confirmed that, if they win, they will organise referendums on Frexit and Nexit (admit it; ‘Brexit’ at least sounds better). Petry has not dismissed European integration as such, but does want a referendum on the Eurozone. While this might appear harmless in comparison, it raises the serious question of whether the European Union can continue to exist without the Eurozone, or whether the two are now so entwined that the dismemberment of the common currency area will drag the entire European project with it. Predictions at present are unclear, but 2016 was a year of wrong predictions. “Brexit? After the fury of the Scottish schism, surely the English will come to their senses.” “Trump? That incompetent charlatan? Of course not!” Yet here we are. If there is one thing to learn from last year, it is that we are out-of-step with our own populations. It must be conceded that none of this may happen. In early December 2016, pundits expected that Austria would end up under an admittedly ceremonial, but powerfully symbolic right-wing populist, the first since the defeat of the New Order in 1945. Instead, the new president is to be a liberal politician and former member of the Greens. Perhaps there is hope, and perhaps further hope for popular support for the EU will come from an unlikely source – Brexit. In the summer of 2016 Europeans feared a surge in anti-Europe sentiment across the continent. This has admittedly happened. But as the shock of Brexit – whether horror or elation – dulls into banality and tedium, it is increasingly clear that Brexit is going to be an ugly, messy, mutually spiteful process. And in a dark irony, this might be the salvation of Europe. None of this may happen. In late November last year the European Parliament’s chief negotiator, liberal MEP Guy Verhofstadt, reportedly welcomed Brexit secretary Davis Davis ‘to hell’. Perhaps his words were more prescient than even he imagined, as one of the EU’s first casualties of 2017 was Great Britain’s representative to the Union, Sir Ivan Rogers. The man charged with negotiating as painless a divorce as possible left with what may transpire to be an ominous warning on “muddled thinking”. Closely following this came a statement by the British Prime Minister which seems to indicate a more bitter separation than originally imagined. Regardless of when Mrs May triggers Article 50 (“when”, not “whether”, as the latter would be at the risk of national rioting and the overnight evaporation of public faith in British democracy), neither Britain nor Europe is prepared for an exit within two years. Current indications suggest that negotiating Britain’s exit could take a decade. Assuming that there is still a European Union to leave in the mid to late 2020s, the painful, dragged-out negotiations of Brexit and the continued possibility that the first country to leave the EU will suffer severe economic decline, EU policymakers and anti-EU politicians in Europe may look to Britain and realise, respectively, that the Union needs urgent and substantial reform and that withdrawal has long-term national disadvantages which outweigh the short-term party advantages of winning a few years in office. But in 2017, Brexit is no longer the dominant issue. While the British – whether Leave or Remain – might imagine that they are the EU’s main talking point, it is clear that in the minds of EU policymakers and administrators, the British and their internal squabbles are a sideshow. Another financial crisis, in a crumbling Eurozone which cannot be propped up forever, is not only inevitable but imminent. The shaky deal between a Union scrambling to shore up its borders and a Turkish Republic rapidly sliding towards authoritarianism appears increasingly untenable. If Recip Erdogan reneges on the deal Europe will likely experience a second Migration Crisis which, in a year of border fortifications and mutual mistrust between populations and politicians, will make 2014 pale in comparison. And while there is hope of a significant thawing in relations between the White House and the Kremlin in the wake of Mr Trump’s inauguration, a geopolitical vacuum following the imminent defeat of Islamic State and the continuing weakness of the Russian Federation’s economy present new urgencies and opportunities for Mr Putin to cling onto power through further foreign meddling. The recent arrival into Eastern Europe of large contingents of American armour indicates that Europe may face a new standoff against Russia. These are gloomy predictions, but 2016 was a gloomy year. Is there sufficient reason to believe that 2017 will be different? All in all, much to think and write about. We aim to provide you with our own reflections, but we will strongly welcome guest contributions from others. If you are interested in writing a piece for this blog, don’t hesitate to write to us! We are interested in all aspects of Brexit, from its significance in Scotland and its fallout in EU nations, to its portrayal in media and its impact on those academic libraries on which many readers of this blog so urgently depend. 2017 will be a testing year for Europe, so make your voice heard! More details on how to submit ideas or posts are available here. Wishing you all the best for 2017! |
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